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Introduction
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome assigned five goals 
to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): (i) to 
increase productivity, (ii) to ensure a fair standard 
of living for farmers, (iii) to stabilize markets, 
(iv) to assure the availability of supplies, and (v) 
to ensure reasonable prices for consumers. These 
goals were relatively uncontentious at that time.
But issues surrounding CAP have become 
significantly more complex. Climate change, water, 
and energy have joined challenges that emerged 
during the 1990s, such as food safety and quality. 
Some of these are largely the effects of human 
activity, for example, adjustments to changes in 
previous policies. Others, such as natural resource 
management, are imposed and/or magnified by 
humans, like resource misallocation or waste.
Many challenges require the use of a much broader 
range of policies than in the past, and private as 
well as public sector involvement. This observation 
follows the lesson taken from enforcing the 
Treaty of Rome: the use of one policy, guaranteed 
production prices, to achieve the five goals of the 
Treaty largely explains the total or partial failure to 
achieve the last four CAP objectives.
This overview presents the eight papers presented 
at the Conference on 2020 European Agriculture. 
Two main conclusions emerge from these papers. 
First, one constant in all debates over long term 
challenges, including climate change, water, 
and energy is that more international trade is 
essential for an increase in the global resilience of 
agriculture. Second, better targeting of public and 
1 Pierre H. Boulanger is Research and Teaching Fellow at Groupe 
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private policies is critical—including public policies 
with a budgetary dimension, such as much larger 
and better designed subsidies for agricultural-sector 
research and development.
Long-term challenges: Climate change, water, 
and energy
The time horizon of these three intertwined 
challenges is quite different. Problems related to 
climate change will develop over the coming century. 
Those related to water are increasingly pressing 
and energy issues already show how difficult the 
decision-making process is, and in the case of 
biofuels, how costly incorrect decisions can be.
Nelson’s paper, “Agriculture and climate change”, 
presents the complex “machinery” of the models 
generated by the work of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). These models 
try to simulate the interactions between the physics 
and chemistry of the atmosphere, oceans and land 
surface, and those between humans and their 
activities, of which agriculture is only one.
Nelson draws four common conclusions from the 
six models. First, the world appears to be able to 
continue to feed the increasing human population 
during the 21st century despite climate change. 
Second, it is very likely that there will be substantial 
differences between regions, with some benefitting 
and others adversely affected. Third, developing 
countries, especially the poorest ones, are the most 
likely to face negative effects. Last but not least, an 
important means of adapting to these challenges is 
to facilitate trade among countries and/or regions, 
a result that may surprise many decision-makers, 
but one that has been confirmed by a recent French 
report (INRA and CIRAD 2009). 
These results have significant policy implications. 
First, they require creating more open trade in 
agriculture: cuts in tariffs and subsidies gain The German Marshall Fund of the United States 4
a new “raison d’être” as a tool for combating 
climate-driven hunger. Second, freer trade must be 
combined with a wide range of pro-active policies, 
such as (i) taxes or cap-and-trade regimes that 
reveal the damaging effects of climate change-
inducing emissions, (ii) pro-poor and pro-
development policies capable of helping the world’s 
poor who perhaps face the most severe impact of 
climate change, and (iii) a wide range of investment 
policies in agricultural and rural infrastructure 
and research-development in order to mitigate and 
adapt to the effects of climate change. 
Schultz’s paper, “Agriculture and water”, focuses on 
water availability, a problem expected to become 
increasingly critical in many countries. Water is a 
‘local’ good, and the fact that water resources are 
unevenly distributed yet expected to be globally 
sufficient to support a population of nine billion 
people is only a part of the problem. 
Agriculture is the primary consumer of water, 
with irrigated agriculture currently accounting 
for 70 percent of world water withdrawals. Any 
solution to the water problem thus requires serious 
improvements in agricultural water use, both 
in terms of irrigation efficiency and rainwater 
management. Roughly 45 per  cent of today’s world 
food production uses 1.1 billion hectares without any 
water management system (hence with low yields) in 
comparison with 40 percent on 0.3 billion hectares 
of irri  gated land and up to 15 percent on 0.1 billion 
hectares equipped with a drainage system. All of 
these problems are complicated because they should 
also address water quality and sustainability. Schultz 
describes the many water management policies 
that are urgently needed, from increased storage to 
basin-wide planning, water system modernisation 
to stakeholder control, at local or national levels. 
A key ingredient to these measures is a better 
pricing regime for water, and therefore an enhanced 
definition of water property rights.
Le Vernoy’s comments in “Agriculture and virtual 
water” add a critical aspect that would remove 
pressures on water policies. If water is a ‘local 
good’, then intra- or inter-national agricultural 
trade can link local water resources and their 
associated farm productions to widely-dispersed 
food consumptions. This ap  proach is captured by 
the notion of “virtual” water, that is, the volume 
of water required to produce a given commodity. 
As the specific water requirement for a crop varies 
significantly in space and time from one country to 
another, trade of farm and food products represents 
virtual water flows between water-rich and water-
poor countries, and between water-efficient and 
water-inefficient countries.
Levi’s paper, “Agriculture and energy”, focuses on 
biofuels—a highly developed issue. Fossil fuels 
have been the backbone of growth during the last 
two centuries, but they are expected to become 
increasingly rare within the next fifty years and 
there is a range of competing successors. Should 
agriculture contribute to solving this problem by 
developing biofuels? In this respect, the ethanol 
and biodiesel first-generation biofuels experience 
deserves a cost-benefit analysis. 
Levi begins by examining the three key rationales 
for introducing biofuels. First, energy security 
has historically been the leading feature of biofuel 
promotion. However, fears of oil and gas supply 
cut-offs do not represent a sound rationale for 
promoting biofuels for at least two reasons: There 
are many alternative measures, from diversification 
of supply to increased efficiency in the use of 
fossil fuels. Moreover, current biofuel technologies 
consume large amounts of natural gas through 
the production of fertilizers and in processing 
feedstock into fuel, hence exacer  bating security 
problems rather than alleviating them, especially in 
gas-dependent regions such as Europe.2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 5
Second, biofuels could be a solution to mitigate 
climate change. The net impact of biofuels is 
difficult to assess. Under fixed land-use, emissions 
of greenhouse gases resulting from biofuels are 
generally lower than those from the gasoline or 
conventional diesel they displace. However, from 
the energy crop planting to the consequent-biofuel 
burning, this first impact is only significant for 
sugarcane-based ethanol; it is very marginal for 
corn-based ethanol. More importantly, biofuels 
replace previous food production and hence 
generate land use changes, with pastures and 
forestries being transformed into crop fields. Such 
an indirect effect tends to be very negative, in some 
cases reversing decades of the positive effects (if 
one assumes fixed land use).
Third, biofuels have the potential to drive up global 
food prices, as best illustrated by the food price 
surges in 2007–2008. Substantial increases of food 
and energy prices were largely triggered by shifting 
land traditionally devoted to food production to the 
production of first-generation biofuels.
These observations raise two questions. First, could 
one expect better results with second-generation 
biofuels, mostly based on crop residues (such as 
cornhusks) and woody biomass (such as wood 
chips)? Such biofuels are projected to have a lower 
impact on agricultural land. But it remains to be 
seen whether they will fulfil their promise as none 
are currently produced commercially.
Second, what role should governments play in the 
biofuel sector? The most important conclusion 
in this respect is what they should not do. 
Governments should stop the large-scale support 
of both production and consumption of first 
generation biofuels, as well as public incentives for 
hazardous land use conversions. Beyond this urgent 
action, the main pro-active public policy in biofuel 
matters would consist of support for research and 
development investments in second generation 
biofuels, reinforcing a recommendation already 
underlined by climate change policies.
Agriculture and new public policies
The coming years will see the development of three 
types of public policies which were largely marginal 
during previous decades: those dealing with food 
safety and security, those targeting structural 
adjustment and those ensuring agricultural and 
rural areas’ “multi-functionality.”
These policies deal with concerns that often nurture 
fears and protectionism. It is worth recalling that 
the European diet, an essential component of 
health, has little in common with typical diets 
thirty or forty years ago, and this is mainly due 
to international trade of food and farm products. 
That said, in a rapidly globalizing world, a key 
question raised by these three policies is to know 
how to develop them while limiting distortions on 
production and trade. 
Swinnen’s paper on “Agriculture and food security, 
safety and quality” focuses on recent concerns, 
reflecting the top rank of safety and quality issues in 
European preferences. The traditional focal points 
of agricultural policies, food security or adequate 
quantitative supply of agricultural products, are 
becoming less important in European agricultural 
policy, although they are still present among the 
main policy objectives. European Community (EC) 
expenditures are still dominated by market and 
income support. What can therefore be said to be 
the optimal policy mix with regard to food security, 
food safety and food quality?
Food security is largely a demand problem, not 
a supply problem. This observation has two 
consequences. First, the EC should address 
food insecurity by ensuring a sufficient level of 
income for its poorest consumers (similarly, in 
developing countries, poverty reduction would 
also ensure food security, especially for households The German Marshall Fund of the United States 6
located in rural areas). Such an approach suggests 
a public policy shift, away from farm income 
support towards the issues of risk and uncertainty 
related to agricultural markets. Second, if upward 
pressures on farm and food prices would induce an 
increase in world production, lagging productivity 
growth rates in Europe (and elsewhere) make 
investment in research and development critical 
for an improvement in the productivity of farm 
production, while reducing the pressures of biofuels 
on farm and food prices. In this context, the EC 
should consider to reallocate a substantial share of 
the CAP budget for encouraging green technologies 
and stimulating the “rural/food/bio” economy.
Food safety policy has been a Member States’ 
competence until the early 2000s, except for 
veterinary rules. It is based on an integrated ‘from 
farm to fork’ approach focusing on tractability, 
controlling risks in all the stages of farm and food 
production and distribution. The EC has also 
adopted many specific sector regulations, from 
pesticide use to packaging restrictions. Since such 
regulations have been designed and implemented 
recently, it is essential to evaluate whether they 
are efficient enough in addressing public concerns 
related to food safety, and whether they need to 
be adjusted in the perspective of the coming CAP 
reform, trade agreements and trade developments.
Quality policy is not institutionalized at the 
European level, though it benefits from support 
granted under the CAP Pillar II, with some of the 
programs being explicitly linked to upgrading or 
producing quality. Most of the policy initiatives 
are recent and enforced at the Member State level. 
Governments are presently getting involved in the 
quality schemes and are setting up public–private 
partnerships, unlike the recent past when quality 
was only a private-sector initiative. Whether there 
is a need for a European layer for the food quality 
system remains a key policy issue for the future. 
Swinnen’s paper highlights a crucial point as to 
what extent European food safety and quality 
policies are barriers or catalysts to trade. Not only 
can almost any standard cause trade distortions, 
but there are also critical dynamics between  
public and private standards, the latter usually 
being more restrictive than the former. Hence, 
two key questions need to be raised. First, is there 
a need to make some adjustments in regards to 
public standards in light of rapidly growing  
private standards? Second, how could or should 
these standards be dealt with at regional and 
multilateral levels?
Moreddu’s paper on “Agriculture and structural 
adjustment” begins by noting that structural 
adjustment reflects changes in resource allocation 
in a moving economic environment, leading to the 
consolidation and diversification of farm holdings. 
The paper stresses farmers’ intrinsic ability to adapt, 
a feature often underestimated by governments and 
sometimes slowed down by public regulations and 
existing institutions.
Moreddu identifies the economic motivations 
behind public intervention in adjustment matters. 
First, authorities may want to facilitate ongoing 
adjustment for reasons of economic efficiency, 
such as in case of market failures, or when 
adjustment costs exceed short-term benefits. 
Second, public actions can be triggered by equity 
concerns, for example minimizing losers’ losses 
or limiting increases in income differences. Most 
EC adjustment measures pertain to CAP’s Pillar 
II Axis 1, which targets the competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector. 
Moreddu’s text pays special attention to the 
importance of ex ante evaluations of adjustment 
problems. Lessons drawn from recent experience 
among OECD countries suggest three specific 
recommendations about adjustment policies. First, 
government should let farmers develop their own 2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 7
capacity for adjustment. Second, public support 
for adjustment should be irreversible and time-
limited, unlike current Pillar I direct payments. 
Third, they should be consistent and integrated 
into the existing system. These recommendations 
complement the general principles of optimal 
agricultural policies: (i) identifying goals in a 
transparent way, assessing costs and benefits, 
winners and losers, (ii) decoupling between support 
and production, (iii) adapting level of efforts to 
expected results, and (iv) flexibility and equity.
Harvey’s paper on “Agriculture and multi-
functionality” examines the concept often used 
to justify continued support to farm production, 
namely market failures in the presence of 
externalities and public goods. It underlines the 
following crucial problem: Governments rarely 
address the origins of such failures, such as ill-
defined property rights, and excessive transaction 
costs. Thus, policies tend to be inefficient and 
ineffective in solving the farm multi-functionality 
puzzle which is in a state of continuous flux and 
dominated by local considerations, individual 
preferences and future aspirations on both 
demand and supply sides. In such a context, the 
provision of multi-functional services through the 
current Single Farm Payment scheme is doomed 
to be a delusion.
This analysis leads to two decisive 
recommendations regarding the evolution of 
the most expensive CAP instrument. First, the 
Single Farm Payment scheme should be phased 
out because it is unable to provide the appropriate 
amount of conservation, amenity, recreation 
and environmental (CARE) goods and services. 
Second, EC Member States should define, design, 
implement and fund their own CARE programs—
and they should do so in the most decentralized 
way possible, if they want the origins of the failures 
to be addressed.
To conclude, Harvey defines the three tasks that the 
EC should be confined to. First, it should regulate 
competition between Member States in order to 
ensure a level playing field within the European 
market. Second, it should promote economic 
development and cohesion between regions. Third, 
it should encourage research and development, and 
expand the potential of European agricultural and 
rural lands as multi-productive resources.
Agriculture and new private policies
The last decade has seen greater importance placed 
upon private policies capable of addressing a wide 
range of issues in a more appropriate manner than 
public policies. The management of increasing 
risks and the emergence of more complex farm and 
food market structures are among issues that have 
gained prominence.
Molander’s paper on “Agriculture and risk 
management” begins with an overview of the 
main risks faced by farm business, namely, risks 
generated by climatic events, sanitary calamities, 
price fluctuations and public regulation, risks 
related to labor force, farm assets and financial 
markets. Not all of these are agriculture-specific. 
A key point is that there is no evidence that risks 
in agriculture are specific enough to receive 
exclusive treatment, or more precisely, to require 
more public intervention. In the same vein, are the 
effects of climatic instability, capital intensity and 
externalities more important in agriculture than in 
other economic activities?
Independently from these considerations, what 
matters is risk management per se; the benefits 
expected from the use of already well-developed 
instruments in other sectors. Molander focuses on 
a set of instruments that are increasingly drawing 
farmers’ attention, from insurance schemes to 
various types of forward contracts, illustrating 
the relevance of such private law instruments The German Marshall Fund of the United States 8
in most circumstances. By the same token, he 
strongly suggests limiting public intervention to 
“catastrophic” occurrences, when usual statistical 
techniques on which private risk management is 
based cannot cope with the magnitude of events.
These observations suggest that the role of public 
intervention in risk management is rather limited. 
Nevertheless, Molander’s paper underlines the role 
of public authorities in ensuring transparency and 
a level playing field in the European market, a point 
echoed by the next paper.
Spector’s paper on “Agriculture, agribusiness 
and competition policy” begins by underlining 
prevailing tensions between CAP and competition 
policy, the two most integrated European policies. 
CAP was mostly based on “common market 
organizations” (CMOs) with commodity-price 
fixing, production quotas in some instances, 
production and export subsidies, and severe 
barriers to entry in the sector, such as access 
to land. All of these instruments are generally 
prohibited by competition policy.
However, since the early 2000s, successive CAP 
reforms have notably reduced CAP abnormality 
with respect to basic competition principles. The 
most significant changes have seen most CMOs 
dismantled, the elimination of quotas (or planned 
elimination) and declines in highly distorting 
subsidies. However, national or regional decoupling 
modalities of direct payments may impede 
competition between member states.
That said, Spector’s paper explains how competition 
policy has also evolved, allowing it to take into 
account certain specificities of the agricultural 
sector. This point is crucial as, contrary to a popular 
belief, the agricultural sector is within the reach 
of competition policy, as illustrated by decisions 
taken by the competition authorities, such as a 
2003 competition case in which the Commission 
prohibited minimum purchase prices for some 
categories of beef in France.
The specific arguments that competition policy 
could take into account are not those mentioned in 
favor of production subsidies or import restrictions, 
rather, they are those related to market structures. 
For instance, competition authorities may 
recognize the legitimacy of market organizations, 
as long as the limited restrictions to competition 
imposed by such organizations are aimed at solving 
clearly identified market failures and are unlikely 
to harm consumers’ interests. Another domain 
where competition authorities may look favorably 
at the farmers’ stance is the critical relations 
between farmers and distributors, particularly 
large retailers. Again, competition authorities will 
not intervene systematically in favor of one of 
the two sides. Rather, they will try to ensure that 
distributors’ market power will not be excessive, 
to prevent the imposition of prices so low that 
farmers will be induced to decrease production, 
or to innovate less. In short, the tensions between 
CAP and competition policy may still be systematic 
on certain points, but the competition authorities’ 
“rule of reason” approach opens a degree of 
convergence with farm policy that is increasingly 
based on farmers operating in more competitive 
markets.
A final remark: European agriculture and 
budget in 2020
Despite their wide coverage of issues, the eight 
papers provide an extraordinarily convergent view 
on farm and food policies to be followed in the 
next decades: a much wider set of instruments, 
each of them targeting a very specific issue, 
ranging from fundamental public policies, such 
as a better definition of property rights on water, 
to detailed private measures such as insurance 
schemes for natural disasters. Table 1 visualizes the 2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 9
main changes in policies suggested by the various 
authors.
To what extent will the European budget reflect 
these profound changes? Answering this question 
raises the issue of the political legitimacy of CAP. 
Clearly, the legitimacy of key current instruments, 
such as the Single Farm Payment, is rapidly 
declining. European tax-payers are likely to grow 
more reluctant to pay subsidies to large farmers 
that are based on increasingly faraway productions 
and yields; it remains to be seen whether such an 
evolution includes small farmers.
Similarly, the political legitimacy of subsidies to 
farmers for the provision of environmental services 
is unclear. European public opinion surveys imply 
mixed feelings on whether such subsidies should 
be granted to farmers who have so often polluted 
the environment during the past half century. 
Agriculture is an uneasy exception to the principle 
that the polluter should pay.
For all these reasons, it seems likely and indeed 
desirable that the post-2013 CAP budget will be 
subjected to deep, but progressive cuts. Such cuts 
Table 1. Declining policies and emerging policies
Declining policies Emerging policies
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should also be much greater for Pillar I than for 
Pillar II.
However, stopping here would be a serious 
mistake. A common theme of the reviewed papers 
is the huge need for investment, in particular for 
research and development related to areas such as 
new seeds, crops and production processes. As a 
result, European farmers should join industrialists 
in asking for a massive shift of the post-2013 
European budget to research and development 
investments, a more accurate term than subsidies. 
They will benefit from such funds via increased 
productivity, lower costs, more diversified inputs 
and products. (Arrow et al. 2008)
Such a dramatic shift deserves two final remarks. 
First, designing research and development 
investments (subsidies) is not straightforward. 
Arrow and alii 2008, provide a non-exhaustive list 
of key criteria to be respected for such subsidies: 
(i) stable commitments over a long period of time; 
(ii) a wide coverage, including the fundamental 
capacity to perform research in the future (for 
example, education and laboratory capacities); 
(iii) tolerance of failures that could provide 
valuable information and (iv) institutions (such 
as independent agencies, peer reviews, multi-year 
appropriations, payments based on progress and 
outputs rather than cost recovery) that minimize 
the risk of capture of research and development 
subsidies by public or private vested interests. 
It is rather concerning that EC Research and 
Development Policy meets these criteria rarely, if 
at all.
Second, European funds should also be devoted to 
stimulate research and development appropriate 
for countries poorer than Europe. This perspective 
could be seen as selfish to the extent that it may 
indirectly favor European farmers investing in land 
outside the EC, as they do already. However, such 
funds are by far the best policy that the EC could 
offer to repair the serious damage that the “old” 
CAP has inflicted upon the farm and food sectors 
of developing countries over the last fifty years.
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Unchecked climate change eventually will have 
dramatic effects on agricultural production, 
consumption and trade. The nature of these changes 
and the extent of their negative effects on human 
wellbeing remains clouded by uncertainties, in 
the climate models themselves, the success of our 
efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions and 
our collective ability to facilitate adaptation to 
change. This paper highlights potential changes 
and associated issues for agricultural science, 
markets and domestic and international policy. 
It discusses the adaptation options potentially 
available to agricultural producers and the role(s) 
that agriculture could play in mitigating its own, 
significant contributions to climate change as well 
as contributing to mitigation of greenhouse gasses 
(GHGs) emitted from other sectors of the economy.
Climate change and agriculture: 
What do we know about the effects?
The earth’s climate is changing because 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasses 
have been growing rapidly since the industrial 
revolution. These gasses trap solar radiation that 
would otherwise be reflected into space, raising the 
earth’s temperature. Figure 1 shows the now-familiar 
graph of increases in average global temperature 
from 1880 to 2008 and an especially rapid increase 
in the last 20 years of the twentieth century. Figure 2 
displays simulations of possible future temperature 
ranges, depending on the extent to which GHG 
emissions are controlled. Most of the scenarios show 
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temperature increases by the end of the 21st century 
that dwarf those of the twentieth century.
Figure 1: Global Land-Ocean Temperature Index, 
1880–2008 with 1951–1980 as baseline. 
Source: http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/graphs/, Accessed January 14, 2009.
Figure 2: Multi-model means of surface warming 
relative to 1980–1999. 
Source: Figure 10.4 in Meehl, et al. (2007). 
The increased energy in the atmosphere manifests 
itself in higher average temperatures, more evapo-
transpiration and hence more overall rainfall but 
with changes in atmospheric circulation patterns 
so that the distribution of rainfall over the surface 
of the earth will change, both in space and in time. 
Without reductions in GHG emissions growth, 
the average global temperature will continue to The German Marshall Fund of the United States 12
increase, as Figure 2 shows, with the rate and 
magnitude dependent on quantity and timing of 
these emissions. Extreme events such as the melting 
of the Greenland ice cap or changes to thermohaline 
circulation (the Gulf Stream across the Atlantic and 
its counterparts in other parts of the world’s oceans) 
would exacerbate the effects from temperature and 
rainfall alone.
Temperature increases, changes in precipitation 
location, intensity and timing all affect agriculture, 
with the effects varying significantly by region. 
However, significant uncertainty remains in how 
these effects play out over the surface of the earth. 
To understand the uncertainty it is useful to describe 
briefly the process by which the results depicted 
in Figure 2 are derived. They start with global (or 
general) circulation models (GCMs) that model 
the physics and chemistry of the atmosphere and 
its interactions with oceans and the land surface. 
Several GCMs have been developed independently 
around the world. Next, integrated assessment 
models (IAMs) simulate the interactions between 
humans and their surroundings, including industrial 
activities, transportation, agriculture and other 
land uses and estimate the emissions of the various 
greenhouse gasses (carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide are the most important). Several 
independent IAMs exist as well. The emissions 
simulation results of the IAMs are made available to 
the GCM models as inputs that alter atmospheric 
chemistry. The end result is a set of estimates of 
precipitation and temperature values around the 
globe often at 2 degree intervals (about 200 km 
at the equator) for most models (see Table 8.1 in 
Randall, et al. (2007) for details about the models 
used in the 4th IPCC assessment). Periodically, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) issues assessment reports on the state of our 
understanding of climate science and interactions 
with the oceans, land and human activities. The 
fourth assessment reports (AR4) were issued during 
2007 and work has begun on AR5.
Figure 3: 2080–2099 Temperature and Precipitation 
Changes, Hadley Model and A1B Scenario
Figure 4: 2080–2099 Temperature and Precipitation 
Changes, GCM3.1 (T63) Model and A1B Scenario
Source: http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/suppl/Ch10/Ch10_indiv-maps.
html, accessed January 16, 2009.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show temperature and 
precipitation results from AR4 for the 2080–2099 
period for the A1B scenario from two widely 
reported models—the British Hadley Model and 
the Canadian Third Generation Coupled Global 
Climate Model. The top row of figures is for the 
three month period December to February; the 
bottom row is June to August. There are two main 
points to take away from these figures. First there 2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 13
is broad agreement across the models, both in 
terms of magnitude of temperature increases and 
the spatial pattern. For example, the high latitudes, 
both north and south, will see the largest increases 
in temperature and large stretches of Africa will 
get drier. Second, the models exhibit significant 
differences in some locations and seasons. For 
example, the Hadley model generally has higher 
temperatures in Africa in the June–August period 
than does the GCM3 model. 
Figure 5: Europe 2080–2099 Temperature and 
Precipitation Changes with the A1B Scenario
Source: Figure 11.5 in Meehl et al (2007) .
Figure 5 provides a closer look at Europe for the A1B 
scenario using the combined results from a suite of 
climate models. According to Meehl et al (2007), 
“The warming in northern Europe is likely to be 
largest in winter and that in the Mediterranean area 
largest in summer (pages 873–874).”
Figure 6 shows the potential for increased 
occurrences of 100-year droughts in the 2020s 
and the 2070s in Europe. Again the results differ 
in details for the different models but southern 
Europe is likely to see substantial increases in 100 
year drought events in both periods and in the early 
period in central Europe.
Figure 6: Europe 2080–2099 Temperature and 
Precipitation Changes with the A1B Scenario
Source: Figure 3.6 in Kundzewicz, Mata et al. (2007). Change in the recurrence 
of 100-year droughts, based on comparisons between climate and water use in 
1961 to 1990 and simulations for the 2020s and 2070s (based on the ECHAM4 
and HadCM3 GCMs, the IS92a emissions scenario and a business-as-usual 
water-use scenario). Values calculated with the model WaterGAP 2.1 (Lehner, Döll 
et al. 2005).
Climate change, agriculture 
and world markets
Research on the effects of climate change on world 
agricultural markets is still relatively limited. Crop 
and animal production are affected both by changes 
in temperature and precipitation. Agricultural trade 
flows depend on the interaction between inherent 
comparative advantage in agriculture, which is 
determined in part by climate, and a wide-ranging 
set of local, regional, national and international trade 
policies. Uncertainties in where climate changes 
will take place mean lack of clarity about the effects 
on agricultural production. These uncertainties 
combine with the complexity of the agricultural 
policy environment to make simulations fraught 
with peril. Nonetheless, some researchers have 
attempted to do so.
Papers in 1992 (Tobey, Reilly et al. 1992) and 1994 
(Reilly, Hohmann et al. 1994) concluded that The German Marshall Fund of the United States 14
agricultural impacts of climate change would in 
some cases be positive and would be manageable 
globally. Global warming would not seriously 
disrupt world agricultural markets. Negative 
yield effects in temperate grain producing regions 
would be buffered by interregional adjustments in 
production and consumption. A key assumption 
was that part of the production losses from 
temperature and rainfall would be offset by CO2 
fertilization. Another key assumption was that 
continued liberalization of agricultural trade flows 
would lead to an agricultural system more resilient 
in the face of uncertain effects of climate.
A widely cited 2004 publication (Parry, Rosenzweig 
et al. 2004) based on more complex modeling of 
both climate and agriculture using the AR3 results 
was still relatively sanguine about global food 
production but with more caveats than the earlier 
papers. “…the combined model and scenario 
experiments demonstrate that the world, for the 
most part, appears to be able to continue to feed 
itself under the SRES scenarios during the rest 
of this century. The explanation for this is that 
production in the developed countries generally 
benefits from climate change, compensating 
for declines projected for developing nations. 
While global production appears stable, regional 
differences in crop production are likely to grow 
stronger through time, leading to a significant 
polarisation of effects, with substantial increases 
in risk of hunger amongst the poorer nations, 
especially under scenarios of greater inequality 
(A1FI and A2) (page 66).” These results are strongly 
influenced by the assumed CO2 fertilization effect 
of over 10 percent for wheat, rice and soybeans and 
five percent for maize. Without CO2 fertilization, 
the prognosis is not nearly so bright.
A 2007 study (Reilly, Paltsev et al. 2007) that 
simulates agricultural response to climate change 
and incorporates general equilibrium economic 
effects finds that yields would likely increase in all 
regions, with smaller gains in the temperate regions 
than previous models but positive yields in the 
tropics. As with the earlier studies, their results are 
strongly affected by the CO2 fertilization effect. In 
addition, they make fairly strong assumptions about 
crop biological behavior in response to climate and 
other changes. 
Two important question marks stand out when 
evaluating these studies. First, the benefits of CO2 
fertilization are extremely important in essentially 
mitigating the rainfall and temperature effects of 
climate change. However, a recent report on field 
experiments on CO2 fertilization (Long, Ainsworth 
et al. 2006), finds that the effects in the field are 
approximately 50 percent less than in experiments 
in enclosed containers. And another report (Zavala, 
Casteel et al. 2008) finds that higher levels of 
atmospheric CO2 increase the susceptibility of 
soybean plants to the Japanese beetle and maize 
to the western corn rootworm. So the actual, field 
benefits of CO2 fertilization remain uncertain. 
Second, these results all depend on an increasingly 
open world trading system, where climate-induced 
shortfalls in some regions can be offset by imports 
from others. The recent failure of the Doha Round 
suggests skepticism on whether such trade flows 
would actually take place. And even if the trading 
environment becomes as open as assumed in the 
modeling exercises, there remains the question of 
whether climate-induced declines in agricultural 
production and exports in some regions can be offset 
by increases in production and exports of other 
products in other regions. 
Finally, the recent history of agricultural trade is 
driven by the rapid growth in production and export 
of high-value agricultural crops from the developing 
world, often produced in niche agroclimatic zones. 
Essentially no research has been done on the extent 
to which those products would be affected negatively 
or positively by climate change.2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 15
Agricultural adaptation to climate change
Even with the best efforts of world climate 
negotiators it seems unlikely that we will be able 
to forestall some climate change consequences. 
The question then becomes what are the most 
cost-effective ways to adapt to the change. The 
challenge is especially daunting both because of the 
uncertainty of the nature and spatial distribution of 
the possible changes and the long lead times needs 
for some proposed adaptation efforts. 
A key point is that a pro-growth pro-poor 
development agenda that supports agricultural 
sustainability also contributes to climate change 
adaptation in the developing world. Adaptation to 
any kind of change is easier when individuals have 
more resources at their command and operate in an 
economic environment with flexibility to respond 
quickly to changes. If, as seems likely, the effects 
of climate change will fall disproportionately on 
the poor, a policy environment that enhances the 
opportunities for the poor will also be good for 
climate change adaptation. The set of pro-growth 
policies and programs that are needed extend 
beyond the borders of any country. A common 
theme of the studies reported above and others 
is the need for a more flexible and open world 
economic environment. For developed countries, 
this means the reduction and eventual elimination 
of agricultural trade barriers and reduction in 
agricultural subsidies that indirectly distort world 
markets. It means a renewed emphasis on foreign 
assistance that enhances the productive base of the 
aid recipients, especially agriculture and natural 
resources. For developing countries, pro-poor, 
pro-growth policies include increased investment in 
agriculture, rural infrastructure and market access 
for farmers with an eye to targeting investments 
that also assist the poor. Beyond the need for good 
development policies, four types of policies and 
programs are needed in the developing world  —in 
agricultural science and technology, water storage 
and management, rural infrastructure investment 
and internalizing the negative and positive 
externalities associated with environmental services. 
Agricultural science and technology
Even if climate change were not coming, greater 
investments in agricultural science and technology 
are needed to meet the demands of a world 
population expected to reach 9 billion by 2050 and 
where large portions of the developing world will 
have higher incomes and desire a more diverse 
diet. Agriculture science- and technology-based 
solutions are essential to meet those demands. 
Beyond these general needs, is the urgency of an 
emphasis on crop breeding, including biotechnology, 
that targets abiotic and biotic stresses to address 
the likely outcomes of climate change. In essence 
we need to breed for crops that respond reasonably 
well over a range of production environments rather 
than extremely well in a narrow window of climate 
conditions. One example is the efforts of the Gates 
Foundation funded project “Stress-tolerant rice for 
poor farmers in Africa and South Asia (STRASA),” 
a collaborative effort between the Indian Council 
of Agricultural Research and the International 
Rice Research Institute. One of the powerful 
lessons of the Green Revolution is that the indirect 
benefits of improved agricultural productivity 
through job creation and low food prices can be an 
extremely powerful approach to poverty alleviation. 
Productivity enhancements that increase resilience 
in the face of climate change pressures will likely 
have similar poverty-reducing effects.
Water storage and management
Even without climate change, the world’s growing 
demand for fresh water is outstripping supplies in 
many parts of the world (Rosegrant, Cai et al. 2002). 
Improvements in water productivity are critical and 
climate change, with increased variability in rainfall 
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the need for improvement in water harvesting, 
storage, and management. Investments in physical 
infrastructure are needed, including large and small 
dams and water retention investments in some parts 
of the world. Equally important is moving more of 
the world’s fresh water from being an open access 
resource to one that moves through markets and with 
property rights assigned. New crop management 
technologies, such as conservation tillage and 
integrated soil fertility management practices, will 
be needed to conserve water in many locations, with 
the added benefit of increased productivity and likely 
increases in carbon sequestration. 
Rural infrastructure investment
Good agricultural development policies and 
programs include investments in rural infrastructure, 
both physical, such as roads, market buildings and 
storage facilities, and institutional such as extension 
programs, credit and input markets, and reduced 
barriers to internal trade. All of these are needed to 
cope with the uncertainties of climate change. 
Internalizing the negative and positive 
externalities associated with environmental 
services
As human influence and dependence on ecosystems 
grows, the economic costs of previously innocuous 
uses of environmental services such as disposal of 
CO2 in the atmosphere and human waste in lakes 
and rivers become unsustainable. The economist’s 
first best solution to a negative externality is to assign 
property rights to the hitherto open access resource. 
This is essentially what is happening to the use of 
the atmosphere as a dump for GHGs. But there 
are other environmental resources, such as nature’s 
ability to generate fresh water, where growing human 
demand has outstripped nature’s capacity to supply. 
Whether classical property rights, such as those 
associated with the ownership of land, or novel rights 
assignments such as in a cap and trade system of 
control, the externalities need to be brought to the 
market place. 
Understanding the spatial context
An essential feature of agriculture is that location 
matters. And the impacts of climate change will be 
intensely spatial. One of the key research needs to 
guide adaptation to climate change is to understand 
the spatial effects, at a scale that policy makers and 
farmers deal with. Analyses that report results at the 
regional level are useful for documenting trends but 
crops are planted on fields and irrigation systems 
are designed for valleys, not areas that include half 
a continent. Figure 7 illustrates the importance of 
spatial information. It highlights areas were changes 
in irrigation management are likely to reduce Indian 
methane emissions. This type of analysis can provide 
valuable insights for regional and local government 
agencies in identifying locations where mitigation 
payments would be most effective.
Figure 7: Location of changes in  
GHG emissions with mid season drying, 2000  
(change in mt CO2e/ha/year)
Source: Own estimates.2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 17
The Costs of Adaptation
We are in early days in our attempts to understand 
the nature of adaptation needs and the associated 
costs. A recent IFPRI Policy Brief (Fan and 
Rosegrant 2008) provides some estimates of the 
investment needs in agricultural research, roads 
and irrigation to substantially meet the first 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) of halving 
the proportion of poor and hungry people by 2015 
(see Table 1). The report finds that an additional 
$14 billion per year would be needed to meet 
MDG1 over baseline investment expenditures. For 
the entire developing world, this analysis calls for 
a tripling of research expenditures, a somewhat 
smaller increase in expenditures on rural roads and 
only a doubling of irrigation. However, regional 
results differ. For example, in Sub Saharan Africa, 
a tripling of investments would be needed with 
rural road expenditures needing to increase almost 
4 times. While these results are only for meeting 
MDG1, they provide some indication of the 
magnitude of numbers needed to adapt to climate 
change. Presumably the challenges of adapting 
to climate change in addition to meeting MDG1 
will cost more. A doubling of expenditures, i.e. to 
an additional $28 billion per year, is probably a 
reasonable starting estimate.
Climate Change Mitigation in Agriculture
Globally, agriculture contributed about 14 percent 
of annual GHG emissions and land use change 
and forestry a further 19 percent in 2000 (Table 
2). However, the relative contributions differ 
dramatically by region. For example, in Europe, 
agriculture’s contribution is only 9 percent of total 
European emissions, but in Sub-Sahara Africa, 
agriculture’s share is 13 percent and land use change 
and forestry contributes over 60 percent.
The relatively recent recognition of the magnitude 
of agriculture and forest-based GHG emissions 
and the initial estimates of the relatively low 
opportunity cost associated with halting 
deforestation raised hopes that rapid mitigation 
in agriculture (broadly defined) might offer some 
breathing room while negotiators address the 
difficult challenges of slowing emissions from 
power generation and transportation. The inclusion 
Table 1: Annual Total Agricultural Investment ($ billion in 2008 US$) Required to Achieve 
Significant Progress on MDG1 (Unit Cost/IMPACT Method) by 2015
Sub Saharan 












Agricultural Research  0.65 0.71 0.21 1.93 0.42 3.92
Rural Roads  0.74 0.13 0.51 1.27 0.09 2.74
Irrigation 0.56 3.84 1.8 0.72 0.74 7.66
TOTAL 1.95 4.68 2.52 3.92 1.25 14.32
Very-High-Investment Scenario
Agricultural Research 1.83 1.54 3.18 4.06 0.99 11.6
Rural Roads  2.90 0.49 0.43 3.26 0.32 7.40
Irrigation 1.02 5.47 0.81 1.13 1.03 9.46
TOTAL 5.75 7.50 4.42 8.45 2.34 28.46
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of REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation) formally in the current 
climate negotiations is a recognition of this 
potential role. However, as more careful studies of 
the possible implementation mechanisms emerged, 
the way forward to reduced deforestation became 
less clear. It is one thing to implement cap and trade 
for 1,500 coal fired power plants in the U.S. It is a 
challenge several orders magnitude larger to find 
mechanisms to dissuade poor people in developing 
countries to stop cutting down trees.
Nevertheless, there are a number of technology and 
management changes in agriculture that could be 
potentially highly cost-effective sources of GHG 
mitigation, including above and below-ground 
carbon sequestration and reduction of methane and 
N2O emissions. I discuss several briefly below.
Agriculture-based options to mitigate 
emissions from other sectors
Plants contribute to sequestration by storing carbon 
above ground in woody material or below ground 
in living root structures or organic material such 
as old roots and plant litter. Changing crop mixes 
to include more plants that are perennial and/
or with deep root systems increases the amount 
of carbon stored in the soil. Cultivation systems 
that leave residues and reduce tillage, especially 
deep tillage, encourage the buildup of soil carbon 
(e.g., Batjes 2004; Dumanski 2004). Shifting land 
use from annual crops to perennial crops, pasture, 
and agroforestry increase both above- and below-
ground carbon stocks. And at least some studies 
find that using more fertilizer, especially in the 
form of manure, increases soil organic carbon (see 
for example, Fellman, Franz et al.; Ogle, Breidt et al. 
2003), although this also runs the risk of increasing 
N2O emissions.
Biofuels are sometimes touted as mitigating fossil-
fuel based emissions and are seen in some IAMs 
as key to reducing GHG emissions. For example, 
a recent study (Gurgel, Reilly et al. 2007) shows a 
climate mitigation policy scenario where biomass 
production is required on about 25 percent of the 
land area where plants can survive (i.e., excluding 
deserts and polar regions).
Figure 8: Land use change
Source: Gurgel, Reilly et al. (2007), Figure 5c.
Table 2: 2000 GHG emissions by sector and region
Total GHG emissions 
(MtCO2e) Share from agriculture Share from land-use 
change and Forestry
Europe 7,600 9.1 0.4
North America 7,208 7.1 –4.7
South America 3,979 23.6 51.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 543 12.7 60.4
Asia 14,754 14.4 26.8
World 40,809 14 18.7
Source: cait.wri.org, accessed January 22, 20092020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 19
Recent studies, however, have suggested that 
the GHG mitigation effects of biofuels may be 
smaller than previously estimated because of 
indirect effects on land use. A 2008 article in 
Science (Searchinger, Heimlich et al. 2008) found 
that maize-based ethanol nearly doubles GHG 
emissions over 30 years. A later article in 2008 
(Nelson and Robertson 2008) estimated that 
Brazilian land use changes induced by the higher 
sugar and maize prices caused by biofuels mandates 
would eventually release CO2 equal to almost 3 
percent of today’s atmospheric CO2.
Options to mitigate agricultural emissions
Agricultural practices that emit greenhouse gasses 
include cultivation practices that result in soil 
carbon being converted to CO2, irrigation that 
allows inorganic decomposition and the release of 
methane, and application of nitrogenous fertilizers, 
both organic and inorganic, that are incompletely 
taken up by the plant and the nitrogen is converted 
to N2O. Reductions in methane emissions from 
irrigated rice can be obtained by mid-season 
drying that allows decomposition to take place 
aerobically (see Figure 7). Nitrogenous fertilizer 
applications can be timed to reduce release of N2O 
to the atmosphere and formulations used that allow 
more complete update. New crop varieties are being 
developed that use nitrogen more efficiently.
Combining adaptation and mitigation
One bright spot in an otherwise gloomy 
assessment of climate change and agriculture 
is that many adaptation practices also mitigate 
GHG emissions and in some instances increase 
agricultural productivity. For example, crop 
management practices that increase soil organic 
matter, and therefore sequester carbon, increase 
the soil’s ability to retain water and increase yields. 
Finding and supporting such practices, with 
information dissemination, agricultural research, 
infrastructure investments, and policy reforms, can 
pay multiple dividends.
Concluding remarks
There is little doubt that climate change will 
affect the agriculture we leave to our children. 
Without immediate control of GHG emissions 
by us, they can expect more rainfall but with 
increased variability and more intensity, and higher 
average temperatures and changes in locations of 
temperature extremes. For many, the outcomes are 
likely to be negative. Extreme events, such as the 
melting of the Greenland icecap, are low probability 
but would engender even more dramatic changes in 
agriculture and elsewhere, mostly for the worse.
Agriculture could potentially play an important role 
in mitigation, both by reducing its own emissions 
and by sequestering carbon released in other 
sectors. However, the extent of this potential is 
uncertain and more research, both on sequestration 
technologies and policy instruments to encourage 
cost-effective mitigation, is urgently needed. The 
potential benefits of carbon sequestration in the soil 
are large and worthy of more careful research at the 
global level. And given the long gestation times of 
research, technology and policy instrument trials, it 
behooves us to start immediately.
Technology solutions, such as more drought 
resistant crops, varieties that perform well over a 
range of climatological conditions, bioengineered 
crops that are utilize nitrogen more effectively, 
and changes in management practices, will be 
important to help us adapt to the likely changes. 
Equally important is that we allow and encourage 
the adjustments to any climate-change-induced 
changes in comparative advantage with an open 
and flexible trading system. More and more 
transparent globalization will be at the heart of 
adaptation with widespread benefits.The German Marshall Fund of the United States 20
Acronyms and their meanings
GCM – global (or general) circulation model
IAM – integrated assessment model
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
CO2 – carbon dioxide
CO2e – a measure that allows the greenhouse 
effects of different GHGs to be added up.
N2O – nitrous oxide. A unit of N2O has 298 times 
the greenhouse gas effect of CO2. Created in 
agriculture as a byproduct of the use of organic and 
inorganic nitrogenous fertilizer
CH4 – methane. A unit of CH4 has 25 times the 
greenhouse gas effect of CO2. Created by anaerobic 
(without oxygen) decomposition of organic 
material. Major agricultural sources include 
irrigated fields and animal flatulence.
ECHAM4 – a GCM. “The ECHAM climate model 
has been developed from the ECMWF atmospheric 
model (therefore the first part of its name: EC) 
and a comprehensive parameterisation package 
developed at Hamburg therefore the abbreviation 
HAM) which allows the model to be used for 
climate simulations.” http://www.ipcc-data.org/
is92/echam4_info.html
HadCM3 – GCM developed by the UK’s Hadley 
Centre for Climate Prediction and Research
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Bart Schultz1
Summary
The coming 25–30 years global food production 
will have to be doubled in order to maintain food 
security at the global level. Especially for the 
emerging countries and to a certain extent also 
for the least developed countries this implies that 
to a large extent a transition will be required from 
subsistence agriculture to food production. In the 
near and medium term future it will also be required 
that a substantially larger increase in production will 
be achieved than continuation of the present trend. 
In relation to these developments a summarized 
overview is given of the role of water management 
for global food production. Improvement and 
expansion of irrigation and drainage systems, in 
combination with water saving, increase in water 
storages and a strong focus on sustainability will 
play a crucial role to achieve this.
Introduction
The coming 25–30 years global food production 
will have to be doubled in order to maintain food 
security at the global level. Most of the increase 
(80–90%) will have to be realized at existing 
cultivated land. The remaining would have to 
come from newly reclaimed land. Especially for 
the emerging countries and to a certain extent 
also for the least developed countries this implies 
that to a large extent a transition will be required 
from subsistence agriculture to food production. 
In relation to this development a summarized 
overview will be given of the role of water 
management for agriculture, with a focus on global 
food production. The possibilities of the various 
options for water management will be presented 
and reviewed.
Population, population growth  
and global food needs
By December 2005, there were 6.5 billion people. 
Global population is expected to grow to some 9 
billion in 2050 (Figure 1). Most of the population 
(73%) lives in emerging countries and most of the 
population growth in percentage is expected in 
the least developed countries.2 In the developed 
countries, no growth is expected. Population 
growth is expected to take place predominantly in 
the urban areas in the emerging and least developed 
countries. As a result 60% of the worlds’ population 
is expected to live in cities by 2050 (Figure 2) 
(K.C., 2008). For emerging countries, there is 
the additional complication that the standard of 
living is rapidly rising, resulting in an increase 
in consumption per person and change in diet 
(Schultz et al., 2005). When we look at the present 
and probable future needs for cereals Schultz et al. 
(2009) have shown that the required increase in 
production would have to be substantially larger 
then continuation of the present trend.
The above figures imply that higher yields will have 
to be obtained at existing cultivated land and that 
at least a substantial part of the subsistence farming 
in the emerging and least developed countries 
will have to be transformed into food production 
for the urban population. In the developed 
countries this process has in general taken place 
during the past century. A similar trend may be 
observed in many of the emerging countries, 
where for centuries farmers cultivated one ha or 
less, but where nowadays either farm sizes are 
rapidly increasing and mechanization is coming 
up, or farmers shift to specialised cultivations to 
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Delft, the Netherlands and top advisor Rijkswaterstaat, Utrecht, 
the Netherlands. This paper is to a large extent based on the 
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poverty alleviation by Bart Schultz, Henri Tardieu and Alain 
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on Water for food and poverty alleviation, February 2009, and 
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get more revenue from their small plot, or enter 
into part time farming. Regarding China, for 
example, simulations show that food security can 
be maintained without increasing the current water 
allocation to agriculture (400 km3/year) (Jianxin 
Mu et al., 2008). However, the condition is that 
high yields of cereals need to be achieved (10 tons/
ha for maize) with a very strong growth in the next 
decades. All these developments will have their 
implications on the lay out and level of service of 
water management systems. Therefore significant 
progress in irrigation efficiency and rainwater 
management needs to be made (Perry, 2007).
The role of water management
At present 45% of global food production is 
achieved on 1,100 million ha without any water 
management system, 40% is achieved on 270 
million ha irrigated land and 15% at 130 million 
ha rainfed land provided with a drainage system 
(Schultz et al., 2005). Table 1 shows percentages of 
no system, irrigation and drainage per continent 
and type of country.
In the areas without a water management system 
rainwater management may result in some 
improvements, especially in the livelihood of poor 
farm families. There is, however, no way that these 
Figure 1. Population in 2005 and prognoses for 2025 and 2050 




















3 Developed countries. Most of the countries in Western and 
Central Europe, North America and some countries in Central 
and South America, the larger countries in Oceania and some 
countries in Asia;  
Emerging countries. Most of the Eastern European countries 
(including Russia), most of the countries in Central and South 
America, most of the countries in Asia (including China, India 
and Indonesia), and several countries in Africa; 
Least developed countries. Most of the countries in Africa, several 
countries in Asia, 1 country in Central America and most of the 
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areas can contribute significantly to the required 
increase in food production.
In order to achieve the required increase in food 
production the share of irrigated and drained 
areas will have to increase. This can be achieved 
by installation of irrigation or drainage systems in 
areas without a system, modernization of existing 
irrigation and drainage systems, installation of 
irrigation systems in rainfed areas with a drainage 
system, or installation of drainage systems in 
irrigated areas (Schultz, 2001; Schultz et al., 
Figure 2. Development of the percentage of urban 
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Table 1. Role of water management in agricultural cultivation practices in the different continents 
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*  In total about 130 * 106 ha rainfed and 60 * 106 ha drainage of irrigated areas
**  Irrigation may include drainage as well2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 25
2005). With respect to this also improvements in 
institutional aspects of system management need 
to be considered. There is thus a need to consider a 
series of water management solutions from purely 
rainfed to large-scale irrigated agriculture (Figure 
3) (International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI), 2007).
Irrigated agriculture counts for some 70% of total 
water withdrawals on earth. It will therefore be of 
importance to continue with the efforts to increase 
the efficiency of irrigation water use. However, 
even with the most effective measures in the field of 
water saving it will still be required to increase the 
withdrawals for irrigation combined with increase 
in water storages. A complication is that many 
countries in the arid and semi arid zones have 
reached, or are already beyond their water carrying 
capacity: they use more than the renewable amount 
(Plusquellec, 2002). Pollution of water resources 
and environmental concerns with respect to the 
application of agro-chemicals may reduce the 
potential for their use for agriculture.
Vision on water management 
for food production
During the Second World Water Forum, which was 
held in March 2000 in the Hague, the Netherlands, 
the World Water Council (WWC) has, among 
others, presented a sector vision on ‘Water for Food 
and Rural Development.’ The span of time for the 
vision was 25 years. In order to achieve the required 
increase in food production in the framework of 
sustainable rural development, the following issues 
with respect to water management were considered 
to be of major importance (after Van Hofwegen and 
Svendsen, 2000):
Figure 3. Diverse options for agricultural water management 













protection and management, and food security, 
protection of the environment, sustainable 
rural development and livelihood;
•	need	for	increasing	withdrawals	with	15–20%	
to bridge mismatch between demand and 
supply in combination with water saving and 
improved efficiency in irrigation; 
•	need	for	increasing	storages	with	10–15%;
•	basin	wide	planning	for	integrated	
development and management, inter basin 






development and management, modernization 
and replacement;
•	equity,	efficiency	and	economy.
This sector vision would create the basis for 
the future directions. One cannot forecast the 
possible directions in specifics, but trends can 
be seen that may sooner or later result in policy 
decisions, actual guidelines, or standards for design, 
implementation, operation, maintenance and 










For many centuries, water management was mainly 
focused on control of water quantity, by means of 
water supply or drainage. In an increasing number 
of countries, these days one may speak about 
control of both water quantity and quality, though 
at different levels of service, more or less dependent 
on the respective standards of living. What also 
can be observed is that water management in many 
regions is becoming more adapted to diversification 
in land use, and not predominantly anymore for 
agricultural use. In future, it is most likely that 
another step will be taken and countries may aim at 
an ecosystem approach.
It may be estimated that over the next 25–30 years 
the contribution to food production may shift 
from the areas without a system in the direction of 
areas that are provided with an irrigation and/or 
drainage system (Schultz et al., 2005). With respect 
to this it will be extremely difficult to achieve the 
improvement and expansion in irrigation and 
drainage systems without affecting environment at 
all. One will have to live with an acceptable level of 
impacts and possibly aim at compensatory measures 
where possible, especially in the emerging countries.
In relation to the improvement and expansion of 
irrigation and drainage systems there are certain 
specific issues that deserve attention.  
In the developed countries a lot has already been 
achieved. However, in the emerging countries in 
particular, several issues are still far from being 
resolved and significant efforts will be required 
from the parties concerned (Figure 4) to achieve 
sustainable solutions. The issues include:2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 27
•	significant	increase	in	irrigation	efficiency	and	
water saving at main and field system level;
•	institutional	reforms	in	the	direction	of	
stakeholder controlled management and 
government support for modernization  
and reclamation;
•	modernization	to	achieve	more	reliable	
provisions of water delivery services.
In many countries institutional reforms in 
irrigation and drainage system management 
towards stakeholder-controlled management are 
on-going (Japanese National Committee of ICID, 
2000, Czech Committee of ICID, 2001, and Ukraine 
National Committee of ICID, 2002). Transfer of 
systems, or of responsibilities are especially taking 





Such transfers are generally desirable, since 
government controlled organisations in several 
countries have not really been able to improve 
the management. Transfers may require quite 
different approaches (Schultz, 2002). In the 
emerging countries, there is generally a dominant 
component of farmers’ population. In such cases 
the transfers concern transfer of responsibility and 
may be of ownership of parts of the systems from 
the government to the farmers. In these countries 
a significant part of the systems is more than 
thirty years old. Therefore transfers will have to 
go hand in hand with modernization. However, 
in the countries with a transition economy, there 
are specific problems, like: unsuitable layout of 
systems, which is mostly based on the former 
large-scale type of agricultural production, 
uncertain future of the agriculture sector, required 
funding of modernization and resulting operation 
and maintenance, lack of good governance, 
unaffordable pumping systems and environmental 
degradation (after ICID Yalta Declaration, 2002). In 
some countries, there is even not a clearly identified 
Figure 4. Indicative schematization of actors in 
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farmers group. These issues make the transfer 
process quite complicated. 
In several of the countries with a transition 
economy a complete agricultural reform will be 
required, before irrigation or drainage system 
management transfer can be successfully planned 
and implemented, while in these countries the 
farmers are completely uncertain about their 
future and therefore not in a position to commit 
themselves to responsibilities that they cannot 
afford. The economic and financial questions 
that arise with respect to sustainable irrigation 





maintenance of the modernized systems;
•	full	cost	recovery,	or	sustainable	cost	recovery	
(Tardieu and Préfol, 2002 and Tardieu, 2004);
•	cost	sharing	and	capacity	to	pay.
Sustainablity of water management for global 
food production
The issues of cost sharing and capacity to pay are 
the more important in light of the sustainability of 
the modernization and transfer activities. In order 
to promote modernization and transfers in the 
emerging countries governments are increasingly 
funding programs and projects with respect to the 
modernization of irrigation and drainage systems 
from their own budget and not anymore through 
donor funding. Striking examples are China and 
India—together housing about one-third of the 
worlds’ population—where huge investments 
are being made in inter basin water transfers 
and modernization of irrigation systems. Similar 
developments may be observed in many of the 
other emerging countries.
In the least developed countries the situation is 
quite different. In these countries the application 
of irrigation and drainage is only taking place at 
a marginal scale (Table 1). The issues here are not 
so much the transfer and modernization, but how 
can sustainable irrigation and drainage systems be 
developed in future. For these countries it seems 
to be advisable to focus on small and medium 
scale types of systems that can be operated and 
maintained by individual farmers, or farmers groups.
We are more and more concerned about the 
sustainability. In the past, we did not have to be 
so much concerned about this, but increasing 
population pressure, changes in food production 
practices, and over-exploitation, or even exhaustion 
of resources in some extreme cases have increased 
the concerns. The following tendencies can be 











All the irrigation and drainage projects have 
side effects. The challenge has been and will 
be to keep the negative environmental impacts 
at an acceptable level and to support positive 
environmental impacts as far as reasonably 
possible. Of special importance for the sector are:
•	controlled	application	of	fertilizers	and	






Better water management, application of fertilizers 
and pesticides, soil treatment practices, new varieties 
and genetic manipulation can contribute to the 
required increase in yields per hectare. However, 
there are upper limits to each of these possibilities. 
Especially the application of fertilizers and pesticides 
has to be done in a controlled way in order to 
prevent harmful effects on the water quality.
Analysis
The demand for food production cannot be met 
with the existing structure and anticipated trends 
in irrigated and rainfed production. This needs to 
change significantly, at national, regional and global 
levels. The optimal mix of small-scale and large-
scale systems under prevailing and expected future 
conditions will have to be identified. With respect 
to this interactions between agriculture and natural 
resources need to be considered. This will especially 
be the case in Asia and in the Near and Middle East 
where the density of population is the highest.
At global level roughly 7,000 billion m3/year of 
water are at present required for food production. 
This is roughly 1,100 m3/person/year of which 
1,800 billion m3 are supplied by irrigation, the other 
5,200 billion m3 come directly from precipitation. 
Producing 1 kg of cereals costs from 500 to 1,500 
liters of water. Producing oil or meat costs much 
more (to the total process involved) from 3,000 to 
15,000 liters of water per kg produced. Producing 
1 kcal requires roughly 1 liter of water. Each 
person requires a minimum of 2,800 kcal/day i.e. 
2,800 liters/day or 1,020 m3/year. Increasing the 
productivity of agricultural water is nevertheless 
possible and required. With respect to water 
management two main ways are to be considered:
•	Integrated	agricultural	water	management, 
preferably at river basin level in combination 
with efficiency improvements in irrigation 
systems. Increasing hydraulic efficiency 
of irrigation systems by reducing ‘losses’, 
improvement of the systems, change of 
irrigation technologies, improvement of 
operation and maintenance;
•	Increasing	low	yields (i.e., less than 2 tons/ha) 
which generally imply excessive evaporation. 
If all yields would be above 2–3 tons/ha, water 
use at the global level would be reduced by 
about 1,500 billion m3 (Schultz et al., 2009). 
Increase in water use efficiency is mainly 
caused by reduction of evaporation from the 
soil, due to the better cover of the plants and 
the resulting increased interception.
Globally water is not a limiting factor for 
agriculture. But heterogeneity prevails and some 
countries will increasingly face different forms of 
water scarcity. Future needs for water for food are 
huge and up-to-date water management systems 
will be required at a large scale. With respect to the 
water management options the following can be 
stated:
•	especially	in	emerging	countries	
modernization of agricultural water 
management (technical, management, 
institutional, financial, environmental) will be 
required at a large-scale to achieve the required 
increase in food production;
•	it	has	to	be	analyzed	how	institutional	and	
technical water management improvements 
will contribute to increase the food production;
•	it	has	to	be	analyzed	what	types	of	investments	
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resources including non-conventional and to 
modernize existing irrigation and drainage 
schemes to improve water productivity;
•	special	attention	needs	to	be	paid	to	the	
potential role of rainfed agriculture—either 
without a system, or with water harvesting, 
soil conservation, or drainage—in order to let 
it contribute more effectively to food security 
and improvement of livelihoods;
•	it	has	to	be	determined	what	policies	and	
actions are needed to ensure the sustainability 
of water resources and river basin services 
that underpin the increases in agricultural 
productivity that must be achieved.
The issues as outlined before will most probably 
result in a set of development scenarios for global 
food production and the supporting measures in the 
field of water management. The required increase 
in food production means a range of water for food 
between 10,000 and 14,000 billion m3/year. This 
depends to a large extent on the capacity of small-
scale agriculture to increase productivity, on the 
modernization and expansion of irrigation and of 
modernization and installation of drainage systems 
in either rainfed or irrigated agriculture areas. 
At each level of this continuum, the issues of water 
storage, artificial recharge and efficiency need to 
be considered, depending on the local conditions. 
Especially in the emerging and least developed 
countries it will be of importance to analyse 
how water can be managed more effectively for 
sustainable agriculture to continue to be a key 
pathway out of poverty and means to achieve food 
security. It is basically possible to maintain food 
security in the near, mid-term and maybe even in the 
long-term future. However, one may expect that at 
least for the near future the costs will remain at the 
present high level and may even further increase.
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Agriculture and Virtual Water
Alexandre Le Vernoy 1
Introduction
The paper proposed by Prof. Schultz has proven to 
be very convincing by portraying the global water 
picture. And by providing persuasive argument 
and comparison of the water situation in the great 
region of the world. The purpose in this note is 
to scale down from the big picture to the specific 
situation of the European Union and to add some 
general comments to the propositions made by B. 
Schultz.
Nexus
It is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong. 
But, when it comes to water, are we yet close to 
being roughly right? While newspapers swarm 
with gloomy statements on world water scarcity, 
past studies on water supply for the future tend to 
be even more depressing. In reality, we do not have 
a clear knowledge in terms of future availability. 
Evaluating a volume at a specific time is very 
difficult, and predicting future human water needs 
depends much upon choosing the most credible 
scenario. Moreover, forecasted water withdrawals 
for 2000 have been divided by two since the first 
study in 1957:
A global assessment based on yearly and worldwide 
averages merely raises awareness. It may not 
be the most suitable way to depict the situation 
where water is first and foremost a local issue. 
By all means, this type of indicator only shows 
physical water scarcity. Yet, water scarcity results 
from a management deficiency problem. While 
the European Union may not on average feel 
concerned about water shortage, there is a growing 
water gap between some European regions. For 
instance, Spain has a water competitiveness index 
of 885 Inhabitant per hm3 per year against 599 for 
French inhabitants.2 And, this national level does 
not quite capture the difficulties inside a country or 
the dynamic of water sharing.3 This is why, water 
management, strategies and policies are designed at 
1 Research and Teaching Fellow at Groupe d’Economie Mondiale 
(GEM) and former Project Manager at Nestlé Waters, Issy les 
Moulineaux.
2 Ref: FAO Aquastat, online database. Available at http://www.
fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/index.html
3 France is selling water form the Rhone to Catalonia, a thirsty 
northern autonomous community. 
Table 1: Water Scenarios for 2000
Authors Year of publication Projected global water withdrawals  
for 2000 km3 per year
Nikitopoulos 1967 6730
L’vovitch 1974 6325
Falkenmark & Lindh 1974 6030
Kalinin & Shiklomanov 1974 5970
De Mare 1976 6080
Shiklomanov & Markova 1987 5190
World Resource Institute 1990 4660
Shiklomanov & Markova 1996 3940
Shiklomanov 1998 3717
Source: Gleick, (1999).2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 33
the basin level where all actors’ activities are to be 
included into an integrated management approach. 
The very first assessment states that every region 
of the world, every continent will have to face a 
certain level of water stress. If it’s not already the 
case, some parts of the world will have to deal with 
the food and water nexus in an acute way never 
experienced to date. 
Ignoring the exact amount of the supply leads us to 
manage what’s available with caution and to rely on 
a demand-oriented approach. Concerning future 
water demand, expectations are two-fold. First, the 
growing world population is already increasing 
rapidly in countries experiencing water stress. As 
noted in the Human Development Report of the 
UN4 (2006) the description made about the state 
of world water resources is remarkably comparable 
to a Malthusian analysis of food production in 
the 19th century. However, and as noted above, 
scarcity issues are primarily the consequences of 
mismanagements of water resources.5 The second 
aspect is the already shifting diets worldwide. As 
average wealth is increasing, the amount of water 
consumption per capita tends to increase. It is true 
for domestic purposes but also for industrial and 
agricultural purposes. It is particularly obvious 
for agriculture. A growing percentage of the world 
population’s calorie intake is based on meat. This 
trend is even more pronounced in most advanced 
developing countries.6 As livestock products are 
increasingly fed with cereals, the water content of a 
calorie of meat is exploding. 
Plexus 
The real extent of these issues has to be clarified and 
prioritized in order to address them in a responsible 
way that fits into an integrated interplay. As noted 
by Prof. Schultz there are several points of crucial 
importance. Increased water needs for agriculture 
may be compensated with higher water productivity 
and efforts have to be intensified with the view to 
keep eyes on the right target. Irrigated agriculture 
benefits from very high yields in almost all regions 
Source: Own calculations based on Food and Agriculture Organizations–Online Database (FAOstat)
4 On page 133
5 Hoekstra, A.Y. & Chapagain, A.K. (2003). Virtual water 
flows between nations in relation to trade in livestocks. The 
Netherlands.
6 Also in India as Indians rely on vegetarian diets.
Figure 1: Cereals consumption in g per day  
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of the world. On the other hand, rainfed agriculture 
lacks both innovation dynamics and efficient 
management. It has to be noted that European 
agriculture relies on rainfed agriculture for a 
significant part of its food production. For cereals 
rainfed production is evaluated to over 65% of the 
whole production.7
Innovation to unlock the rainfed agriculture 
potential may come from several techniques 
including supplemental irrigation through rainwater 
harvesting and field conservation. But the main 
point is to conquer efficiency. There are many 
management habits in agriculture that contribute 
to an inefficient use of water resources. For instance 
in the EU, the implementation of irrigation grants 
based on agricultural yields through the CAP reform 
in 1992 resulted in excessive support of intensive 
irrigation (Boulanger 2007) which was detrimental 
to European rainfed agriculture. 
One last aspect of water and agriculture is the 
question of water and international trade. This 
idea materialized by the concept of virtual water 
is one of a few tools that help reconcile both the 
demand based and the supply based approaches 
into a single vision. It also offers a link between local 
water specificities and a more global approach to 
agriculture.
Focus: Linking food production and water 
needs through trade
It is now acknowledged that a calorie requires 
about one liter of water to be produced.8 If we invite 
everyone at nature’s great table, will there be enough 
water? Clearly, there will be enough water to sustain 
world’s population globally. And the idea is that local 
water gaps may be partly secured through trade. The 
concept of virtual water is a powerful tool to raise 
awareness concerning the impact of international 
trade on water resources uses (Allan 1997). Virtual 
water is the volume of water required to produce a 
good. In agriculture for instance, the specific water 
demand of a crop varies significantly from one 
country to another, in space and time and according 
to soil and climatic conditions. The idea behind this 
concept is that an import generates a virtual water 
flow and consequently water saving for the importing 
country. In 2000, the European Union imported 
592 km3 of water through international trade. In 
the meantime, the EU exported 420 km3 of water 
creating a net flow of virtual water of 171 km. 3 The 
EU is importing almost a quarter of its available water 
resources. Trade may have an alleviating impact on 
water stress intra-regionally, inter-regionally and 
globally whenever a specific trade policy is enabled to 
favor the most water-efficient producer. 
8 International Water Management Institute, 2007.
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In Europe, water availability is uncorrelated with 
virtual water flows. Studies show a threshold of 
1500 cm/cap/yr below which a country’s cereal 
import become strongly and inversely correlated 
with its renewable water resources (see Yang et al. 
2002). This is typically the case with Middle East 
and North African countries, which are trading 
partners for the EU. It means that EU’s agriculture 
policy has a responsibility to build sustainable 
agricultural water policies inside the borders 
but may need to beggar thy neighbor outside 
the border. Though the EU is well placed to play 
an important role in the field of water savings 
through trade (see Le vernoy 2006), agricultural 
liberalization should be combined with appropriate 
domestic policies that contribute to enhanced 
virtual water flows towards countries that are less 
efficient in the use of their water resources. 
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Michael A. Levi 1
Introduction
Biofuels are receiving increased attention worldwide. 
The International Energy Agency projects that global 
consumption of ethanol and biodiesel will increase 
nearly fivefold over the next two decades, accounting 
for four percent of global transportation fuels by 
2030, up from one percent today (IEA, 2008). 
Growth is expected to be even more pronounced 
in Europe: biofuels consumption is expected to 
quadruple there even as total oil consumption falls, 
vaulting biofuels’ share of the transportation fuels 
market from one to seven percent. Similar trends are 
forecast for the United States.
These “business as usual” projections, however, are 
extremely tentative. They are based on hard-to-
make predictions about future commodity prices 
and, critically, on the assumption that no new 
policies will be put in place to promote biofuels 
growth. But the future will almost certainly be 
different. Concerns about energy security, climate 
change, and food prices, will yield new policies in 
Europe and elsewhere, which will in turn change 
the biofuels landscape. The most bullish pictures see 
biofuels providing nearly half of the world’s liquid 
transportation fuels by 2030 (Vattenfall, 2007). Other 
estimates of a carbon-constrained world foresee a 
much smaller role for biofuels, but one that is still 
substantially greater than in the business as usual 
case (IEA, 2007; IEA, 2008).2
1 David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Envi-
ronment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and 
Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York.
2 (IEA, 2008) projects increased biofuels use in its climate-con-
strained scenarios but does not provide numbers. The “Alterna-
tive Policy Scenario” in (IEA, 2007), which is consistent with 
stabilization at 550 ppm CO2e, projects an increase in biofuels’ 
share of global transportation fuels in 2030 from 3% to 6%. 
This paper explores the basic factors and policy 
decisions that will shape the future of biofuels. It 
then provides several basic recommendations for 
policymakers. Crafting the best biofuels strategy 
possible will require policymakers to carefully 
balance multiple objectives and to draw on policy 
tools from beyond the biofuels sphere.
Energy Security
Concerns about overdependence on oil have 
historically been the primary driver of biofuels policy. 
Oil security concerns typically have several elements. 
Countries have long worried about the possibility 
of oil supply cutoffs, which can, in theory, wreak 
economic, social, and political havoc. These 
concerns trace back to the 1970s. They are less 
salient, however, today. Oil is traded on global 
markets; as a result, lost supply from one source 
can be replaced by imports from another (though 
typically at higher prices.) Wealthier oil-importing 
countries, including those of Europe, have also 
developed a system of Strategic Petroleum Reserves 
(SPRs), several-month stores of oil that can be 
released during supply crises to blunt those crises’ 
impacts.3 Concern about supply cutoffs not a good 
reason to promote biofuels.
Nonetheless, the lack of flexibility in fuel options for 
transportation can lead to high and volatile prices. 
That, in turn, hurts economic growth. Expanding 
fuel options—including through investment in 
greater use of biofuels—can, if done right, help 
moderate and stabilize fuel prices. In addition, 
substitution of domestically produced biofuels for 
imported oil can help alleviate balance of payments 
problems, again with positive economic effects. High 
oil prices and consumption levels also enrich many 
corrupt and undemocratic regimes. International 
security is generally enhanced if greater production 
3 By minimizing the potential impact of any supply shock, SPRs 
also serve as a deterrent to politically motivated supply cutoffs.
Agriculture and EnergyThe German Marshall Fund of the United States 38
of biofuels lowers oil prices and lowers global oil 
imports from such countries. 
Expanded production of reasonable-cost biofuels is, 
however, only one of many policy levers available 
for addressing these energy security challenges. 
Curbing overall demand for liquid fuels, whether 
by using energy more efficiently in transportation 
or by shifting to greater use of electricity to power 
cars and trucks, will be a critical element of any 
effective energy security strategy. The legitimate 
role of biofuels will also depend on whether they 
can be produced at a reasonable cost compared to 
gasoline and diesel. That in turn will depend both 
on how the price of oil evolves, on how biofuels 
technologies and business models develop, and on 
the future prices of inputs for biofuels, including 
feedstocks, energy, fertilizer, and land. It is thus 
impossible to dictate now with any confidence 
precisely how central biofuels should be in future 
energy security strategy.
While oil is central to biofuels’ energy security 
calculus, it is also important to remember that 
natural gas should be part of biofuels’ energy 
security equation. Current biofuels technologies 
generally consume large amounts of natural gas in 
making fertilizer and in processing feedstock into 
fuel. Natural gas consumption presents an energy 
security problem in Europe, and greatly expanded 
biofuels production could exacerbate that. (It is 
worth noting that natural gas is less of a security 
problem in the United States, since most supply there 
is either domestic or from friendly and stable states.) 
Still, biofuels will not be a central determinant of 
European energy security vis-à-vis gas. 
Climate Change
The second big force shaping biofuels policy 
is concern over climate change. Emissions of 
greenhouse gases—primarily carbon dioxide (CO2) 
produced by burning coal, oil, and natural gas to 
produce energy—are steadily accumulating in the 
atmosphere, leading to temperature increases and 
corresponding changes in climate. 
Greenhouse gases are different from ordinary local 
pollution: they typically remain in the atmosphere 
for decades or centuries after they are emitted. As 
a result, unless global emissions are slashed in the 
coming decades, the world will probably see severe 
temperature rises and a wide range of associated 
climactic impacts.
Biofuels have the potential to play a significant role 
in addressing this predicament, since substituting 
biofuels for oil will generally lead to lower net 
emissions. The plants that are used to make biofuels 
absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as they 
grow; that carbon is stored in the plants themselves 
as well as in the underlying soil, reducing global 
greenhouse gas concentrations. At the same 
time, greenhouse gases are emitted in cultivating 
biofuel crops, in converting them to liquid fuel, 
and, ultimately, in burning ethanol or biodiesel 
in vehicle engines. What is the net result? Viewed 
over its full “life cycle”—from the planting and 
growth of biofuels crops to burning the resulting 
biofuels—emissions are generally lower those 
from the gasoline or conventional diesel that they 
displace. How much lower depends strongly on the 
particular feedstock used to make biofuels. Ethanol 
made from corn, for example, probably reduces net 
greenhouse gas emissions very little; ethanol from 
sugar beets roughly halves emissions; and ethanol 
made from sugarcane cuts emissions by about 
ninety percent (Sims, 2008).
This logic, however, is not without problems. In 
many cases, land is cleared specifically so that 
biofuels crops can be grown, which releases large 
quantities of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. 
For example, conversion of peat to growing palm 
for biodiesel is responsible for a large fraction 
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emissions can overwhelm any savings that accrue 
from shifting from conventional oil to biofuels. 
Indeed even if sensitive land is not explicitly 
converted to biofuels cultivation, increased 
production of biofuels can lead indirectly to 
increased emissions. (This phenomenon is referred 
to as “indirect land use change.”) For example, in 
Brazil, agricultural pasture is often converted to 
growing sugarcane for ethanol production. Ranchers 
now require other land to graze their cattle on—and 
if they develop that land by clearing rainforest, as is 
often the case, very large emissions result.4 
Quantifying these phenomena is notoriously 
difficult. This is particularly true in the case of 
indirect land use change, where complex models 
must be used to predict how biofuels production 
in one place will affect land use elsewhere. In 
perhaps the most prominent analysis, a group of 
researchers estimated that emissions savings from 
U.S. production of corn ethanol would take 167 
years to make up for emissions from indirect land 
 
4 This paper does not address the impact of biofuels production 
on water use, which has also raised environmental concerns.
use change. They also estimated that if ranchers 
displaced by Brazilian sugarcane cultivation decided 
to convert rainforest in order to gain new grazing 
land, it would take 45 years for the savings from 
ethanol use to make up for the initial emissions 
(Searchinger, 2008). This analysis has, however, 
been vigorously challenged on a wide range of 
grounds.5 While it is clear that converting carbon-
rich lands such as tropical forest to produce biofuels 
has a net negative climate impact, the net impact of 
converting less carbon-rich lands, especially if done 
with care, is still unknown (Kim, 2009). 
Biofuels are, of course, only one of many options for 
cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Energy can be 
consumed more efficiently, electricity can be produced 
in ways that yield lower emissions, industrial plants 
can adopt technologies that lower their pollution, 
and new fuel sources—including biofuels—can be 
used in transportation. Figure 1 shows one set of 
authoritative predictions for the role biofuels might 
play. The precise mix, however, will depend on how 
 
5 In particular, see the letters to the editor in response to 
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technologies evolve and on policies governments 
choose. That mix is impossible to predict.
Food Security
The third major factor shaping biofuels policy will 
be concern about its expected effect on global food 
prices. Policies that increase demand for biofuels also 
increase demand for feedstocks. If those feedstocks 
have alternative uses as food (as is the case, for 
example, with corn- or wheat-based ethanol or with 
soy-based biodiesel), this in turn drives up food 
prices. Even biofuels production that uses feedstocks 
that are not in demand as food can lead indirectly 
to increased food prices. Cultivating biofuels crops 
on high-quality land that might otherwise have been 
used to grow food, for example, increases the cost of 
good land and hence food prices. Fertilizer-intensive 
biofuels production similarly drives up the cost of 
growing many other crops. 
Skyrocketing food prices have focused 
policymakers’ minds on this tension between 
food and biofuels, though the global economic 
slowdown has brought a temporary reprieve. While 
there has been much debate over the underlying 
causes of the rise in agricultural commodity prices 
that occurred over the last several years, there is 
a general consensus that government support for 
biofuels played at least some role. More important, 
there is broad agreement that all else being equal, 
massive future increases in biofuels production 
could have severe effects on food prices worldwide. 
Unless policymakers can resolve that tension, 
there will be substantial and legitimate pressure 
to curtail efforts to promote biofuels growth.
The near-term challenge may be particularly acute, 
since currently mature biofuels technologies all 
use land that could otherwise be cultivated for 
food production. This limits the tools available 
to policymakers, leaving them with two basic 
options for dealing with the tension. The first 
involves lowering demand for biofuels by cutting 
back existing subsidies and mandates biofuels 
production. Any such step would be controversial 
both because it would affect agricultural 
communities and because concern about energy 
security makes policymakers hesitant to scale 
back their ambitions for moving away from oil. 
The tension between food and fuel might also be 
defused if global agricultural productivity could be 
improved and if the functioning of international 
agricultural markets could be enhanced. While 
such developments would not remove the effect 
of biofuels on food prices, they could offset them 
through other means. These steps would also have 
the benefit of helping keep food costs down even if 
the role of biofuels in causing high food prices turns 
out to be overstated.6
Technological Prospects
The future of biofuels will be determined in large 
part by how biofuels technology develops in the 
coming decades. Biofuels on the market today, 
including ethanol made from sugar beets, corn, 
wheat, and sugarcane, as well as biodiesel made 
from soybeans, rapeseed, and palm oil, are referred 
to as first generation biofuels. Such biofuels, 
however, tend to be relatively ineffective at cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions, because producing 
them consumes large amounts of energy and hence 
generates substantial emissions. Many are also 
relatively expensive, limiting their value on the 
energy security front. The notable exception to these 
rules is sugarcane ethanol, which takes relatively 
little energy (and is also inexpensive) to produce; 
as a result, switching from gasoline to sugarcane 
ethanol is broadly believed to be a cost-effective 
way of cutting emissions—though concerns about 
6 In the very short term, of course, the global economic downturn 
will keep food prices relatively low regardless. But if policymakers 
should take advantage of the opportunity to fix the underlying 
problems, high food prices are almost certain to reoccur.2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 41
indirect land use change still plague even this 
particular biofuel.
The limitations of first generation biofuels have 
prompted policymakers, entrepreneurs, and 
scientists to focus increasingly on so-called second 
generation biofuels. These biofuels, none of which 
are produced at commercial scale yet, do not exploit 
feedstocks that have alternative uses as food. Instead, 
they use so-called “cellulosic” feedstocks. These 
could include crop residues (such as cornhusks) and 
woody biomass (such as wood chips). 
Cellulosic feedstocks have the potential, in theory, to 
reduce the lifecycle emissions from fuel production, 
thereby making biofuels better candidates for cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions while strengthening 
energy security. This is because the feedstocks 
involved would require either less energy to grow 
or less energy to process into fuel—or both.7 (Using 
crop residues, for example, would essentially 
eliminate any emissions associated with growing 
feedstocks specifically for fuel.) At the same time, by 
focusing either on using land that is not suitable for 
growing food, or by using the same land for food and 
fuel production simultaneously, second generation 
biofuels present the possibility of addressing the 
tension between food and fuel production.
It remains to be seen, however, whether second 
generation biofuels will fulfill their promise. 
Breaking down cellulosic biofuels into a form that 
can be converted to fuel is difficult, and while a 
variety of technology options are well understood, 
none have been demonstrated at reasonable cost 
or at commercial scale. The ultimate fate of second 
generation biofuels will depend on whether costs 
can be brought down to competitive levels and on 
whether the scope of production can be expanded 
by many orders of magnitude. This will depend 
7 Crops that needed less fertilizer would also reduce emissions of 
nitrous oxide, a potent greenhouse gas.
not only on scientific developments but also on 
the business models that develop around different 
technologies and feedstocks, which themselves 
will have major impacts on viable cost and scale of 
biofuels production (Sims, 2008).
A shift from first to second generation biofuels will 
also have important implications for agriculture. 
First generation biofuels are generally grown on 
agricultural lands; they also use many of the same 
inputs that traditional agriculture does. Demand 
for first generation biofuels thus tends to have a 
strong impact on agriculture. The impact of second 
generation biofuels is, however, less clear. 
Some paths promise new commercial opportunities 
for farmers. Demand for crop residues that can 
be converted to fuel, for example, will make those 
crops more valuable. 
Meanwhile, if lands that are currently used only 
in some seasons can be put into use producing 
biofuels feedstocks during the rest of the year, that 
will open up new opportunities too. Other trends 
will be neutral: for example, growth in the use of 
wood chips for fuel production will leave farmers 
largely unaffected, since these inputs for making 
fuel will come from a different sector. That said, if 
second generation biofuels become viable, demand 
for first generation biofuels may drop, removing 
opportunities that currently exist for many farmers. 
The paths that ultimately materialize will depend 
in part on where technology investment is directed 
and in part on the luck of which technologies turn 
out to be most promising.
What Role Should Governments Play?
Governments have to date supported biofuels 
development through a mix of subsidies and tax 
incentives for both producers and consumers of 
biofuels. But while singling out biofuels for subsidies 
and mandates may appeal to the narrow interests 
that benefit from them, these policies cost taxpayers The German Marshall Fund of the United States 42
large sums of money and can also drive up gasoline 
and diesel prices at the pump. They should be 
phased out over time—indeed it is widely agreed 
that current policies are inefficient at best (OECD, 
2008). But what approach is wisest?
Relying purely on markets is ill advised. Biofuels 
may deliver significant benefits for climate change 
and energy security, but, left alone, markets will not 
fully value those. Without special incentives, then, 
biofuels production may be substantially less than 
the social optimum. Many of the most promising 
future biofuels developments will also require 
substantial investment in research, development, 
and demonstration (RD&D) activities. Private 
actors, however, tend to underinvest in RD&D 
because of the high risks involved and because 
the benefits of success accrue not only to them 
but also to their competitors. Lack of government 
policy that addresses this market failure will also 
lead to less than optimal investment in biofuels. 
Meanwhile, even if biofuels subsidies and mandates 
were eliminated, biofuels development might still 
ultimately place strong and undesired pressure on 
food prices—an outcome that government policy 
(including the promotion of properly functioning 
agricultural markets) would need to address.
This suggests that government has three basic roles 
to play. First, it should take steps to make sure that 
the energy security and climate change benefits of 
biofuels are directly reflected in their market prices. 
On the climate change front, this can be done by 
including biofuels production and consumption in 
any cap-and-trade or other carbon pricing scheme 
that is used, which would raise the price of gasoline 
relative to that of biofuels. On the energy security 
front, to the extent that governments are focused on 
oil consumption, it can be accomplished by levying 
lower taxes on biofuels than on traditional gasoline. 
Done right, neither of these steps would be as strong 
a support for biofuels as the current subsidy and 
mandate regimes are, since they would let other 
solutions to energy security and climate change 
problems compete in the market. But they would 
still lead to substantially greater use of biofuels that 
the market would if left to itself.
Second, governments should support RD&D in 
second generation biofuels both through direct 
investment and by providing incentives (beyond 
carbon and gasoline pricing) to private sector 
innovators. Subsidies and mandates may have some 
role to play here in order to provide the market 
scale necessary to attract sufficient investment in 
innovation. But this should be done carefully, with 
an eye toward phasing out such support as markets 
mature, and in a context where other targeted 
policies are used whenever possible. Meanwhile, 
it is important to ensure that investment in new 
technologies is not overly concentrated in any 
particular country or region. Different places may 
prove promising for different feedstocks and— 
equally important—different supply chain and 
business models. International cooperation in 
RD&D can also promote harmonized standards for 
assessing the emissions from different technologies 
and processes, which in turn could help facilitate 
international biofuels trade.
These steps will help the two critical downsides of 
biofuels promotion just discussed. But governments 
must also look beyond biofuels policy. They should 
adopt measures that broadly discourage tropical 
deforestation and other damaging land use change, 
which would blunt concern that biofuels cultivation 
is leading to climate-harming activities. As a start, 
consuming countries should adopt policies that 
avoid promoting the use of biofuels produced on 
recently converted carbon-rich land. This includes 
much of the biodiesel Europe currently produces 
using Southeast Asian palm oil. 
That will not, however, address the challenge of 
indirect land use change. To confront that problem, 
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countries that avoid dangerous land use change 
and deforestation, something that is under active 
discussion in international climate negotiations. 
This would tend to steer new land conversion—
whether directly or indirectly the result of biofuels 
cultivation—away from sensitive lands. Such 
efforts should combine financial compensation 
for countries that leave potentially valuable land 
undisturbed with technical assistance in establishing 
property rights and enforcing land-use laws that 
encourage sustainable land use.
Governments should also confront the tension 
between food and fuel by working to strengthen 
global agriculture. Serious efforts to improve 
agricultural productivity will require, among other 
things, promoting agricultural biotechnology. 
Improving the functioning of international 
agricultural markets will also require that the 
West, including the United States and Europe, cut 
back on subsidies and tariffs. In the long term, as 
technologies for cutting emissions and improving 
energy security develop, and as the factors 
driving food prices become better understood, 
policymakers may also want to deliberately 
discourage the dedicated use of agricultural lands 
for fuel production. In the near-term, if renewed 
economic growth leads again to dangerously high 
food prices, governments will need to seriously 
consider relaxing their biofuels mandates on a faster 
schedule than they might otherwise adopt. 
Despite much recent criticism, biofuels have the 
potential to play an important role in addressing our 
energy security and climate change challenges. But 
they will only do so effectively  —and responsibly—if 
we think broadly and carefully in designing policy 
and begin to shift course now.
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Johan F.M. Swinnen1
Introduction
In the Agriculture 2020 Conference outline the key 
questions for session 5 on “Agriculture, Food Security, 
and Food Safety” are summarized as follows:
“It is important to distinguish food security (a 
sufficient supply of agricultural products) from 
food safety (the availability of “good” quality of 
food). What specific instruments should be used for 
the former and the latter? What is the appropriate 
balance between public intervention and markets, 
between regulations (national, regional, and 
multilateral) and private standards?”
In addressing these issues I start by critically 
examining these definitions of both food security 
(i.e. “a sufficient supply of agricultural products”) 
and food safety (i.e. “the availability of ‘good’ 
quality of food”). This is a crucial prerequisite for 
the development of a coherent policy framework. 
The issue that I will address first is the balance 
between these various policy measures. 
Policy focus and the EU public 
Traditionally the focus of “agricultural policies” has 
been very heavily on supply and income issues, and 
only recently have safety and quality received more 
attention—and even then usually not under the 
umbrella of agricultural policy but rather as part of 
consumer and health policies. An important policy 
question is whether this bias is consistent with 
public demands—and whether it needs adjustment. 
Most of the agricultural policy attention in the past 
has gone to agricultural producer issues i.e. mostly 
about CAP subsidies and trade interventions. 
1 Director of LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic 
Performance, Professor at Department of Economics, Univer-
sity of Leuven (KUL), and Senior Research Fellow at Centre for 
European Policy Studies(CEPS), Brussels.
Consumer and taxpayer interests have received some 
attention in this framework, but other issues less. 
This is an interesting observation in itself since it 
seems to be inconsistent with important consumer 
concerns about quality and safety aspects.
What does the EU public care about most? In terms 
of its preferences for policy attention, does it care 
more about quality than quantity; or does it care 
more about safety or price? While there are no 
obvious data or indicators to measure the relative 
importance of these various issues for the EU public, 
one can get some insights from different pieces 
of evidence. In particular, we look at three: public 
surveys, political pressure, and media attention.
The first set of empirical evidence comes from the 
Eurobarometer survey results. While the survey 
results cannot answer these questions clearly, what 
emerges is that health and food safety concerns 
are very important to EU consumers. Consumers 
associate a variety of health and safety concerns with 
food. Most people worry about pesticide residues 
in fruits, vegetables or cereals. Concerns about new 
viruses like avian flu, residues in meat like antibiotics 
or hormones, unhygienic conditions in food handling 
outside the home (during processing and retailing) 
are the second most worrying issues to consumers.
The second set of empirical evidence looks 
specifically at the political pressure related to 
food policy issues. More specifically, we look at 
the issue when did price/quantity versus safety/
quality issues cause major political problems for 
EU governments? If we look at what has happened 
in Western Europe with regard to food price and 
quantity issue, the last time that the fight between 
consumers and producers over prices lead to major 
government crises was just before and just after 
the second World War.2 For example, in 1936 the 
Belgian government fell over a proposal to increase 
2 See Swinnen (2009) for details.
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grain import tariffs which was strongly opposed by 
workers, represented in government by the Socialist 
Party. From the 1950s onwards, price and quantity 
issues remained important issues, but mostly for 
producers, and never to the extent that they caused 
the collapse of governments—albeit that they 
played a very important role in international trade 
negotiations. In contrast, as recently as the 1990s, the 
political impacts of successive major food safety crises 
were considerable in several EU member states; in 
particular following the BSE, FMD and dioxine crises 
in the second half of the 1990s.3 
The third set of empirical evidence refers to how the 
media covered the food crises. An interesting natural 
comparison is the media coverage of the late 1990s 
food (safety) crises with the current 2006-2008 food 
3 For example, in 1999 the governing parties in Belgium lost 
very heavily after the dioxine crisis. Studies made afterwards 
clearly indicated that the crisis had an important impact on this 
outcome.
(price) crises.4 Such comparative analysis yields the 
conclusion that price issues received important news 
coverage, but typically only in the inner pages and 
often in the economy sections of the newspapers. 
In contrast, the food safety and quality crises in the 
late 1990s were covered much more extensively, with 
much stronger statements and with major front cover 
articles.
In combination, these pieces of subjective evidence 
suggest that for the EU public safety and quality 
issues are at least as, and likely more important, than 
price or quantity issues from a policy perspective. 
The reason for this is most likely related to the decline 
in the share of food expenditure in Europe. Data 
from a hundred and fifty years for Western European 
economies shows that the share of food in consumers’ 
expenditures has gone down tremendously. 
Consumer’s income spent on food declined to its 
10% levels in 2005 while one hundred year ago it was 
4 See Swinnen et al (2005) for details.
Figure 1: Share of food in consumer expenditures
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between 40% and 60%.5 Moreover, the share of total 
food expenditures going to agricultural producers 
has declined even stronger, with increasing share 
going to processing and marketing. 
These observations, of course, raise important 
policy issues regarding the optimal policy mix 
and policy attention to the various elements. 
Interestingly, the recent reforms of the CAP have 
to some extent taken these issues into account. 
For example, the 2003 Fischler Reforms of the 
CAP explicitly mentioned the importance of 
ensuring safe and high quality food (Swinnen 
2008). However, much of the actual expenditures 
under the CAP still went to traditional objectives, 
i.e. market and income support, albeit that most 
support was decoupled from specific production 
activities, and subject to cross-compliance 
requirements (European Commission 2008). 
We will now discuss food security, food safety, and 
food quality policy issues in turn. 
Food security policy
Food security was a major issue in Western Europe 
in the post-World War II era, as the history of 
food shortages was still vivid. As such the formal 
objectives of the CAP still reflect this with its 
reference to ensuring an adequate food supply 
(European Commission 2007). However, although 
the objectives have not formally changed, it is clear 
that the issue became gradually less important in 
EU agricultural policy, even when price hikes in the 
early 1970s brought the issue back temporarily.
5 However, a cautionary note needs to be bear in mind with re-
gard to the enormous heterogeneity that exists across the current 
EU-27. For instance, the previous arguments can not easily be 
applied and generalized for Eastern European countries like Ro-
mania as it is for the rich north-west Europe. The issue of food 
price may also be more important in the income of especially 
poor, unemployed people and pensioners. 
The dramatic food price increases in 2007 and 2008 
have brought food security back to the policy table 
as an important issue. However, several issues need 
to be taken into consideration.
First, extensive research on food security issues 
globally, and particularly in developing countries, 
have made it clear that food security is mostly not 
a supply problem, but a demand problem.6 Wars, 
violent conflicts, or disasters which destroy supply 
lines are an exception to this rule but even then 
demand constraints are important. 
This shift in perspective is also reflected globally 
in changed definitions of food security used by 
international organizations.7 The initial focus, 
reflecting the global food concerns of the early 
1970s, was on the volume and stability of food 
supplies. Food security was defined in the 1974 
World Food Summit as: “availability at all times 
of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs 
to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption 
and to offset fluctuations in production and prices.” 
In 1983, FAO expanded its concept to include 
securing access by vulnerable people to available 
supplies, implying that attention should be 
balanced between the demand and supply side of 
the food security equation: “ensuring that all people 
at all times have both physical and economic access 
to the basic food that they need.” By the mid-1990s 
food security was recognized as a significant 
concern, spanning a spectrum from the individual 
to the global level. However, access now involved 
sufficient food, indicating continuing concern with 
protein-energy malnutrition. But the definition 
was broadened to incorporate food safety and also 
nutritional balance, reflecting concerns about food 
6 This new emphasis on consumption, the demand side and the 
issues of access by vulnerable people to food, is most closely 
identified with the work of Noble Prize winner Amartya Sen. 
Eschewing the use of the concept of food security, he focuses on 
the entitlements of individuals and households.
7 See FAO Food Security website for more details.2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 47
composition and minor nutrient requirements 
for an active and healthy life. Food preferences, 
socially or culturally determined, now became 
a consideration. The potentially high degree of 
context specificity implies that the concept had 
both lost its simplicity and was not itself a goal, but 
an intermediating set of actions that contribute to 
an active and healthy life. The 1996 World Food 
Summit adopted a still more complex definition: 
“Food security, at the individual, household, 
national, regional and global levels [is achieved] 
when all people, at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food 
to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for 
an active and healthy life.”
While the international community has accepted 
these increasingly broad statements of common 
goals and implied responsibilities, its practical 
response has been to focus on narrower, simpler 
objectives around which to organize international 
and national public action. The declared primary 
objective in international development policy 
discourse is increasingly the reduction and 
elimination of poverty. 
In this shifting perspective and emphasis on the 
demand side, the main food security problem in the 
EU relates mostly to those living in poverty, which 
is a small minority in richer EU countries, and a 
sizeable group in poorer EU countries. Possibly in 
size the most important group are older people, and 
in particular those living in rural areas, in some of the 
new EU member states which are living on very low 
pensions and who have to keep working at old ages to 
produce some food for their household food security. 
In terms of policy solutions, the best approach is 
to address the fundamental problem, which is the 
low incomes of these people, e.g. by increasing 
their pensions. 
Second, the current concerns of food security, 
based on the uncertainty whether future food 
supply can meet demand, are related to the high 
food prices in 2007 and the first part of 2008. 
To analyze the policy implications, we should 
first look at the causes of the high prices. Several 
studies have pointed out that the main reasons are 
a combination of structural, temporary, and policy 
factors.8 This includes the growth in food demand 
with the growth in developing countries such as 
China and India—but also in Africa, the growth in 
agricultural commodity demand for bio-energy—
in particular biofuels, declining productivity 
(yield) growth in richer countries, bad weather, 
export constraints imposed by exporting country 
governments, etc. Related to these factors, and 
indirect causes, are policies that have stimulated 
the growth of biofuels (subsidies and mandates), 
the high oil prices which affects both the costs of 
production and the (market) demand for bio-
energy, and possibly climate change which affects 
weather conditions. 
An important observation is that agricultural 
production, both in the EU and globally has 
responded positively to the high prices: production in 
2008 has increased substantially over the past years. 
What does all this imply for policy?
1.  Climate change is the subject of a different 
conference session. I will limit myself to 
the comment that studies seem to show 
that climate change is likely to affect food 
production in different regions quite 
differently and that parts of the EU may be 
negatively affected and parts positively. The 
total impact of climate change on global 
agricultural production as well as on EU 
8 See various reports and studies by IFPRI, FAO, OECD and the 
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agricultural production may be positive, but 
important reallocations appear likely. 
2.  An important policy issue is how to deal with 
bio-energy as a competing demand with food 
for agricultural commodities. The main food 
security policy here appears to be to stop 
stimulating bio-energy demand by removing 
subsidy and mandate policies. 
3.  Even without government support, demand 
for agricultural commodities for bio-energy 
purposes is likely to increase if oil prices 
recover in the coming years. Similarly, the 
growth in food and feed demand from 
countries like India and China is likely to 
continue despite the current financial and 
economic crises in the world economy. It is 
unclear whether productivity trends in rich 
countries will continue to face declining 
growth rates, or whether rapidly increasing 
productivity in developing countries can 
continue. 
4.  However, if the fundamental trends which we 
have outlined here continue, there appears 
to be an upward pressure on agricultural and 
food prices. 
5.  From a policy perspective this has important 
implications.9
  a. It means that agricultural market prices  
will increase in the future and that there   are 
less arguments for governments to  
support farm incomes. 
  b. The dramatic changes (both increases and 
decreases) in commodity and food markets over 
the past years has re-emphasized the importance 
of addressing risk and uncertainty for farmers 
9 These are in addition to potential consumer policies, such as 
advising a less meat-intensive diet. 
and other agents active in agricultural and food 
markets. Policy initiatives and instruments that 
reduce such uncertainty, and the risk associated 
with it, would be important beneficial elements 
in the food production system.
  c. Given the daunting challenges to produce 
more agricultural commodities for food and 
non-food purposes, and the lagging productivity 
growth rates in the EU, there should be 
important policy support and investments in 
R&D and technology development and diffusion 
(a) to improve productivity of agricultural 
production and (b) to reduce the pressure of bio-
energy on food prices.
  d. In this perspective, the EU should consider 
reallocating a substantial part of the CAP 
budget to stimulate green technologies to 
stimulate the rural/food/bio-economy.
  e. In this perspective, the issue whether 
biotechnology should be part of such EU policy 
for the future is an important policy question. 
Food safety policy 
Until very recently, food safety policy was 
mainly a member state’s responsibility, except for 
some veterinary directives from the European 
Commission. The food safety crises in the 1990s, 
particularly the BSE crisis in 1996 and the dioxin 
crisis in 1998, were crucial in changing this. In 1997, 
almost a year after the BSE crisis, the Commission 
launched a new food safety initiative which resulted 
in the publication of its ‘White Paper on Food 
Safety’ in 2000 (European Commission 2000). This 
led to major legislative changes and to the Basic 
Food Law Regulation, including a recast of EU 
veterinary rules, and the creation of the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA).
The main goal of this EU food safety policy 
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smooth operation of the ‘single market’ and taking 
into account existing or planned international 
agreements on standards (like the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) agreements (OJEC 2002). 
The food safety policy follows an integrated ‘from 
farm to fork’ approach since the year 2000. Unlike 
many other approaches which target controlling 
food safety standards at end products in the 
supply chain, this approach tries to control risk 
in all stages of food production and distribution. 
The EU’s Rapid Alert Systems for Food and Feed 
(RASFF) entered into force in 2002.10 RASFF 
uses traceability as a tool to ensure efficient risk 
management and quality control.
The EU has also adopted specific sector rules on 
products of animal origin intended for human 
consumption (Regulation (EC) No 854/2004). 
This act covers fresh meat, fish, milk, dairy, 
poultry etc… while Commission Decisions 
2006/766/EC and 2006/696/EC and subsequent 
amendments specify the list of non-EU countries 
from which imports of these products are allowed. 
In addition, official controls on good hygiene 
rules of HACCAP principles and on maximum 
residue level (MRL) are in practice;11 as do specific 
rules on the use of pesticides; food supplements; 
colorings; antibiotics and hormones in food 
10 The RASFF system covers all foodstuffs and feed. It is com-
prised of a network of all member states, the commission and 
EFSA as a member. There has been an existing early warning 
system in place both at the member states and the Commission 
but the new system extended more to include both food and feed 
under the umbrella of the ‘farm to fork’ strategy. Therefore, the 
network jointly acts to spot unsafe food and feed. If a threat is 
spotted, an EU-wide notification system acts depending on the 
level of risk detected. Rules related to emergency, risk manage-
ment measures during food scare cases and scientific uncertain-
ties are all part food law (DG SANCO, 2007). For more details 
see OJEC (2002, L31/1)
11 The Codex has established MRLs in line with Good Agri-
cultural Practices (GAP). Therefore, national and EU MRL 
standards are assessed against Codex as a reference point which 
sets science as its primary drive to assess risk.
production; additions of vitamins; minerals and 
similar substances in food; products in contact 
with food stuffs-such as packaging.
Key policy issues for the future are:
1.  whether the system as it has recently been 
designed and implemented is sufficient and 
efficient in addressing public concerns related 
to food safety; 
2.  whether current and future ‘agricultural 
policies’ are consistent with the food safety 
rules and policies;
3.  whether there is a need to adjust these 
policies in the light of rapidly growing private 
standards (see further);
4.  whether there is a need to adjust these policies 
in the perspective of trade agreements and 
trade developments (see further).
Food quality policy
While there is both in theory and in practice an 
important relation between safety and quality, one 
can identify several product characteristics which 
consumers may appreciate (color, size, production 
process (no child labor, …), …) but which are not 
safety characteristics. 
There is no real EU quality policy at this moment 
although the European Commission is preparing 
proposals for such a policy. Thus far, there is some 
support for EU quality production under the CAP 
Pillar II (Rural Development Programs) where 
some of the programs are explicitly linked to 
upgrading quality or producing quality. 
Even at the member state level, most of the quality 
policy initiatives are recent. Unlike before, where 
food quality was almost only a private sector 
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in food quality schemes and are setting up the 
public–private partnerships initiatives.
For example, Germany has developed its QS 
(Qualitätssicherung) system, which is one of the 
most elaborate initiatives at the member state 
level. It is a recent initiative (2002–2005) and has 
different types of schemes at all levels of the food 
chain (feed industry, the meat industry, processing, 
retailing, and marketing). The products included 
are pork, beef, veal, poultry—all started in 2002; 
while fruits, vegetables, potatoes and combinable 
crops started in 2004 and 2005 respectively. 
Looking into the essential characteristics of 
this QS system, it is striking that although the 
systems name refers to “quality assurance,” many 
of the controls and assurances relate to safety 
features, including tracability, internal control and 
transparency.
Key policy issues for the future are:
1.  Whether there is a need for an EU level food 
quality system, or to leave this at the member 
state level;
2.  Whether to increase funding for local 
initiatives under the Pillar II;
3.  Whether current and future EU-level 
‘agricultural policies’ are consistent with food 
quality objectives and initiatives;
4.  Whether there is a need to make adjustments 
in light of rapidly growing private standards 
(see further).
Private versus public standards
There has been a rapid growth in private sector 
initiatives in the field of food safety and quality 
standards. The most important—and most far 
reaching—is undoubtedly the GlobalGAP standard 
(formerly EurepGAP) which is now used by all 
main retailers in the EU.
There is an interesting dynamic between public 
and private standards. Private standards may 
be introduced because public standards are 
insufficiently stringent (or absent)—in this way 
they may either be introduced earlier than public 
standards, or may follow after public standards 
are introduced. Private standards may also 
be introduced as a marketing tool, to reduce 
transaction costs in business dealings, to reduce 
information imperfections of consumers, etc. 
In a number of areas, private standards are more 
restrictive than public standards. Fulponi (2007) 
interviewed EU retailers and asked them to 
assess their own standards compared to those in 
government standards. Under the four categories 
(food safety, environment, animal welfare and 
labor), public standards are found to be mostly 
important only in social and labor standards; but 
in all other cases the private standards are more 
important than the public standards. 
With respect to trade issues, public regulations 
require equivalence of risk outcome. It is essentially 
based on the evaluation of the final product which 
is consistent with the SPS agreement of WTO. In 
contrast, private systems may be more demanding. 
GlobalGAP for example requires equivalence of 
systems based as well on the evaluation of the 
process which requires tractability of the product, 
not requested by public standards. Therefore the 
private sector requirements on imports are more 
demanding. 
Finally, the relative importance of public and 
private standards varies strongly. In a comparison 
of standard setting institutions among countries, 
Henson (2004) shows that private and public-
private initiative standards are much more 
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countries. In developing countries 88% of standard 
setting institutions are public rather than private—
which is an interesting observation given the 
problems of enforcement which are characteristic 
of these countries.
Key policy issues for the future are:
1.  Whether there is a need to make adjustments 
(introduce/tighten/relax/remove) of public 
standards in the light of rapidly growing 
private standards. 
EU food safety & quality policies/standards: 
Barriers or catalysts to trade?
To what extent are EU food safety and quality 
policies barriers or catalysts to trade? The 
traditional argument in the international trade 
literature and discussion is that safety and quality 
policies are barriers to trade—i.e. they constrain 
trade by introducing complications and hurdles. In 
an environment where traditional trade protection 
instruments, such as tariffs and quotas, are 
increasingly regulated they are mostly considered 
alternatives for protection under the form of non-
tariff barriers (eg Anderson et al 2004; Fischer and 
Serra 2000, Lapan and Moschini 2004; Sturm 2006). 
In addition, it is generally argued that increasingly 
demanding EU food standards (both public and 
private) are hurting developing countries since they 
are unable to address these standards. Moreover, 
in case they can it is argued that it is mostly 
multinational companies or large producers who 
may benefit but that small and poor local producers 
are either marginalized or exploited in this process 
(eg. Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Farina and 
Reardon 2000). 
However, new empirical evidence and theoretical 
arguments question the validity of these arguments 
in all circumstances. 
First, compliance costs for countries may be lower 
than often thought. World Bank estimates for 
compliance costs are relatively low, in the range 
of 4–8% but not 20–30% as it has often been 
presumed (Aloui and Kenny 2005; Cato et al 2005).
Second, standards can also be “catalysts” for trade 
by reducing transaction costs. That is an important 
reason why the private sector uses standards—
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precisely to reduce transaction cost. This reasoning 
should also be taken into account when we evaluate 
public standards. Also consumers want standards 
because they provide information and reduce 
transaction cost. It is crucial, when analyzing the 
effect of standards in an international economic 
framework, to look at both benefits and costs to 
both consumers and producers. Consumers may 
benefit because of reduced asymmetric information 
(or externalities) while cost increases presumably 
affect them negatively. Producers face increased cost 
because of compliance while they may benefit due to 
increased demand if they can reduce the asymmetry 
problem. There may be additional environmental 
effects that affect the rest of the society.
Taking this into account, Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2008) show that one may 
either have ‘over-standardization’ or ‘under-
standardization’. Almost any standard causes trade 
distortion. However, it can either create more 
trade or it can reduce it. In fact, standards can be 
at the same time catalysts and barriers. Standards 
may affect comparative advantage through 
reinforcing (or weakening) scale economies, 
through differences in implementation costs, or 
in enforcement of standards. These factors may 
differ substantially among countries (Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele 2009). 
Third, new evidence from trade between Africa 
and the EU shows that standards can have major 
effects on the organization of the supply chains 
and in particular on how local suppliers are 
integrated or not. Typically increased standards 
induce consolidation and vertical coordination 
in the chain. However, our studies on Africa also 
show that poor rural households may benefit 
substantially from these export systems, either 
as contract farmer or through the labor market 
(Maertens and Swinnen 2008; Maertens and 
Swinnen 2009; Minten et al 2009). In summary, EU 
food standards may be protectionist instruments, 
but not necessarily. This implies some difficult 
issues for analysts, trade negotiators, and policy-
makers alike: 
•	Unlike	tariffs,	socially	optimal	standards	
are often not zero. Moreover, they may be 
different for rich country compared to poor 
country because consumer preferences are 
different in these countries. So how to separate 
protectionist standards from social welfare 
improving standards?
•	An	increasing	share	of	the	standards	which	
affect trade are private standards. How can/
should these standards be dealt with in 
international institutions dealing with trade 
disputes (WTO)?
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Catherine Moreddu1
Introduction
The European Union has been engaged in long-
term reform of its common agricultural policy 
(CAP) since 1992 with the objective to increase 
the market orientation of the sector. This would be 
achieved by reducing protection and increasing the 
level of the sector’s exposure to world markets while 
decreasing those supports that alter production 
and trade the most (OECD, 2008a). This latter 
shift, designed to reduce the link between public 
support and production, is known as decoupling.2 
This reform results from internal considerations 
on improving economic efficiency and better use 
of public funds, as well as external considerations 
such as international trade negotiations. 
CAP reform continues today along the same 
orientation. It is gradual and progress depends 
on the period, subject and sector under 
consideration. The greatest progress has been 
made in reducing the most distortive forms of 
support, whereas reductions in support levels 
has been less significant. Over the last years, 
there has been more progress in decoupling 
policies than in reducing the levels of protection 
or towards targeting aid to specific objectives. 
This study is based on work undertaken by the 
OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate.3 Since 
the mid 1980s, the OECD has monitored the 
evolution of agricultural policies in member states 
and in some emerging countries, and assesses these 
1 Senior Economist, OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate, 
Division of Policies in Trade and Agriculture, Paris. Paper trans-
lated into English from the original French by Barbara Bender.
2 This issue was studied theoretically and empirically in a 
series of OECD studies which are summarized in OECD 
(2006a). See: http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3343,
en_2649_33777_25110575_1_1_1_37401,00.html
3 This article is based on various OECD studies but reflects the 
view of its author only.
according to their economic efficiency and equity. 
The evaluations are based on economic analyses 
and offer countries the means to compare their 
experiences. Recommendations are put forward 
in terms of means to fulfil policy objectives in 
cost-efficient ways. In addition to studies on 
policy evaluations in general (targeting: OCDE, 
2007c; decoupling: OCDE, 2006a), or by country,4 
the OECD has recently undertaken studies on 
reform adjustment policies (OCDE, 2006b) and 
on related topics such as compensation (OCDE, 
2007a) and farmers’ income diversification 
(OCDE, 2009). In so far as developing countries 
are concerned, a study on small farm adjustment 
was presented at the Global Forum on Agriculture 
in November 2008 (OCDE, 2008c).
It is essential for policy evaluations that their 
external effects and results be analyzed according 
to their objectives. The original aim of CAP 
(article 33 of Rome Treaty) was to 1) increase 
productivity; 2) ensure a fair standard of living 
to farmers; 3) stabilise markets; 4) guarantee 
stable supplies; and 5) ensure reasonable prices to 
consumers. These objectives are still enforced, but 
others related to the environmental sustainability 
of the sector and the viability of rural zones, 
have become important as well. And rather 
than placing emphasis on ensuring sufficient 
quantities of foodstuffs, the emphasis today is 
centred on ensuring food safety and quality. 
If structural adjustment is not clearly mentioned 
in policy objectives, it is implicit in the objectives 
set for productivity and income that are aimed at 
ensuring the sustainability of the agricultural sector. 
However, the importance accorded to adjustment 
4 OECD publishes not only annual reports on the policies follow 
up and assessment in OECD member countries and in emerging 
countries, but also more in-depth studies by country. The most 
recent study deals with Japan and Chile. A study on CAP evolu-
tion since 1992 is to be undertaken.
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by country depends on the level of adjustment this 
country has reached, although in general it has 
become more prominent since EU enlargement 
to countries with specific adjustment problems. 
This article outlines what is meant by structural 
adjustment and lists the conditions where public 
intervention is conceivable at the economic 
level. It then gives a few examples of current 
structural policies and their evaluation in OECD 
studies. Finally, it summarises recommendations 
on how to implement efficient policies that 
attain their objectives at the least cost. 
What is structural adjustment? 
Policymakers distribute resources among 
sectors and individuals within a sector. 
Structural adjustment is the evolution 
of this distribution according to:
•	Changes	in	economic	trends	or;	
•	Sudden	changes	due	to	policy	
reforms or a crisis situation. 
Table 1. Pace of adjustment in various countries, based on agriculture share of GDP and employment
Agriculture share of GDP Agriculture share of employment
Year of 40% Year of 7% Years required Year of 40% Year of 16% Years required
Netherlands  1800 1965 165 1855 1957 102
Denmark  1850 1969 119 1920 1962 42
United Kingdom 1788 1901 113 1800 1868 68
Chile  1875 1980 105 1950 1993 43
Mexico  1890 1992 102 1969 2000 31
USA  1854 1950 96 1897 1950 53
France  1878 1972 94 1921 1965 44
Brazil  1910 2003 93 1960 2005 (20.5%)  >45 
Germany  1866 1958 92 1900 1942 42
Japan  1896 1969 73 1940 1971 31
Poland  1935 1991 56 1968 2006 (18.7%)  >31 
India  1962 2006 (17.5%)  >44  2005 (58%)  -- 
China  1967 2006 (11.7%)  >39  2006 (43%)  -- 
Turkey  1970 2007 (8.9%)  >37  1998 2007 (28.7%)  >9 
Korea  1965 1991 26 1977 1991 14
Indonesia  1971 1997 26 2006 (42%)  -- 
Russia  1992  --  1961 1991 30
South Africa  1970 -- 1950 1980 30
Source: Adapted from Kim, H. and Lee, Y.K. (2003).2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 57
Adjustment is required to maintain maximum 
growth and welfare. In the agricultural 
sector, adjustment should ensure long-term 
viability in a sector where many of its multiple 
objectives are relevant for society and in 
which public intervention is frequent.
Trends that are prevalent in the agricultural sector 
act on the supply side, on increases in productivity 
linked to technical innovations which significantly 
reduce labour inputs, as well as on the increase 
in international competition due to reduced 
transportation costs and levels of protection. On 
the demand side, we note an increase in demand 
by emerging countries that follows the increase in 
their population and income, as well as demand 
segmentation towards more diversified products 
that are of a higher quality, of higher added value 
or more environment-friendly. As the increase 
in production was higher than consumption, 
there was a trend towards lower prices. This 
resulted in an adjustment trend that saw a 
decrease of the share of agriculture in the overall 
economy, a decrease in the number of farms and 
an increase in their average size, although the 
decrease in agricultural land was a less significant 
factor than the role of others in this sector. 
In OECD countries, trend adjustment started long 
ago and is well advanced in most member countries. 
The share of agriculture in the economy is, on 
average, less than 2% of the GDP and less than 6% 
for employment (OCDE, 2009). In the 15 members 
belonging to the European Union, these shares were 
respectively of 1.8% and 3.6% in 2005 (2.8% and 
3.5% in France). In developing countries, the trend 
adjustment began later and is progressing more 
rapidly today (OCDE, 2008c). As shown in Table 1, 
it took more than a century for the United Kingdom 
to lower its agricultural share of GDP from 40% to 
7%, and only 26 years for Korea and Indonesia.
Adjusting to externalities is a growing concern for 
policymakers in OECD countries. These concerns 
include policy reforms, strengthening health and 
environmental regulations, responding to rapid 
shifts in demand (due to panic; trend changes in, 
for example, calorie intake, sweets and fats), sudden 
increases in production costs (energy),  
and sanitary crises. 
Pressures on the sector have led to an increase in 
the average farm size (Table 2) but also to various 
adaptation strategies that have led to greater 
diversification. Without going into too much detail, 
while some farms adapt by increasing their land 
size in order to benefit from economies of scale 
and higher productivity of the workforce and of the 
capital, others prefer to target improved quality, to 
increase added value, or to diversify their activities 
within and outside the agricultural sector. Farm 
diversification mainly consists in direct retailing, 
increased added value on the farm, contractual work 
on other farms, as well as forestry, ecotourism, or the 
production of renewable energy. Diversification of 
income sources outside the farm brings significant 
complements to the household income. These 
sources are primarily derived from salaries, followed 
by welfare benefits. In some countries, such as 
the United Kingdom, capital income is important 
(OECD, 2009). There is also an increasing number of 
farms that are not commercial operations, but rather 
exist as a choice of lifestyle (hobby, retirement).
Why Intervene?
At the economic level, public intervention is 
based on two types of concerns: economic 
efficiency and equity (OCDE, 2002).The German Marshall Fund of the United States 58
Table 2. Shift of average farm sizes in OECD countries in the last decade
Number of holdings Utilised agricultural area Average size Agricultural employment
(1000) % 
change





change 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005
Australia 147 130 -12 463,349 445,150 -4 3,150 3,426 9 419 356 -15
Austria 219 171 -22 3,425 3,266 -5 16 19 23 278 211 -24
Belgium 62 52 -16 1,368 1,386 1 22 27 21 109 84 -23
Canada 277 229 -17 68,055 67,587 -1 246 295 20 537 435 -19
Czech Rep. 82 42 -49 4,281 3,558 -17 52 84 61 328 195 -41
Denmark 69 48 -30 2,726 2,590 -5 40 54 35 108 86 -20
Finland 101 71 -30 2,259 2,264 0 22 32 43 162 122 -25
France 735 545 -26 28,267 27,470 -3 38 50 31 998 864 -13
Germany 567 390 -31 17,344 17,035 -2 31 44 43 1,079 850 -21
Greece 801 834 4 3,578 3,984 11 4 5 7 749 554 -26
Hungary 967 715 -26 4,555 4,267 -6 5 6 27 295 189 -36
Iceland n.d. 4 n.d. n.d. 2,281 n.d. n.d. 570 n.d. 7 6 -15
Ireland 154 133 -14 4,389 4,219 -4 29 32 12 136 116 -15
Italy 2,478 1,729 -30 14,685 12,359 -16 6 7 21 1,327 999 -25
Japan 2,651 1,963 -26 5,038 4,672 -7 2 2 25 3,674 3,174 -14
South Korea 1,501 1,273 -15 2,197 1,921 -13 1 2 3 1,596 1,329 -17
Luxemburg 3 2 -23 127 129 2 40 53 32 4 5 25
Mexico 4,074 2,700 -34 107,200 107,500 0 26 40 51 6,516 5,945 -9
Netherlands 113 82 -28 1,969 1,958 -1 17 24 37 232 214 -8
New Zealand 66 66 0 12,591 11,744 -7 191 178 -7 137 130 -6
Norway 71 53 -25 1,038 1,033 -1 15 19 33 84 64 -24
Poland 2,808 2,477 -12 17,274 14,755 -15 6 6 -3 3,834 2,314 -40
Portugal 451 324 -28 3,924 3,680 -6 9 11 30 547 606 11
Slovak Rep. 78 68 -12 2,446 1,880 -23 31 27 -12 189 92 -51
Spain 1,270 1,079 -15 25,230 24,855 -1 20 23 16 1,072 1,003 -6
Sweden 89 76 -15 3,270 3,192 -2 37 42 14 112 96 -14
Switzerland 79 64 -20 1,083 1,065 -2 14 17 23 225 181 -20
Turkey 4,068 3,077 -24 17,661 18,435 4 4 6 38 9,080 7,398 -19
United 
Kingdom 235 287 22 16,447 15,955 -3 70 56 -21 560 445 -21
United 
States 2,238 2,133 -5 384,796 379,708 -1 172 178 4 3,106 2,913 -6
EU15 7,346 5,821 -21 129,009 124,342 -4 18 21 22 7,473 6,253 -16
EU19 11,281 9,123 -19 157,566 148,800 -6 14 16 17 12,119 9,043 -25
OECD 26,454 20,815 -21 1,220,573 1,189,895 -3 46 57 24 36,999 30,972 -16
n.d.: n/a.




workforce) which, if not adjusted, would 
lead to a suboptimum resource allocation;
•	Limit	short-	to	medium-term	adjustment	costs.	
The intervention should therefore be conditioned 
in the first case by evidence of market failure 
and, in the second case, by a cost-benefit 
analysis of the entire rural economy sector.
Equity concerns
In terms of equity, this usually entails:
•	Monitoring	adjustment	and	compensate	in	
part sudden drops in income or asset values;
•	Ensuring	that	inequalities	in	incomes	
and assets are not increased.
It should be noted that in terms of distribution, 
although farm consolidation increases 
income inequality within the sector, it reduces 
inequalities between sectors given that there is 
an increase in the efficiency of the sector. 
It should also be noted that the majority of 
countries which intervene to facilitate adjustment 
actually slow this process down, which explains 
the longevity of certain adjustment policies. 
What interventions today?
Positions vary from one country to another, 
some being clear-cut, and adjustments have 
different objectives depending on whether they 
are meant to accompany (curb or encourage) 
the trend or react to a given shift. 
On the one hand, there are countries such 
as Australia, where the optimum structure is 
determined by the market while giving farmers the 
means to adapt, for example by giving them access to 
risk management tools (insurances, futures markets, 
transitional support mechanism in case of disaster).
On the other hand, other countries favour more 
general interventions with heavy constraints on land 
use, e.g. Japan or Korea. Some countries intervene 
to influence the structures’ results. This is the case 
for France, with SAFER, but also for emerging 
countries or those in transition that undertook 
land reform (privatisation, the dismantling of large 
farms). The goal of an agriculture oriented towards 
medium size family-run farms is widespread in 
Europe. Some countries such as France seek to 
maintain the current number of farmers. The 
question is how to best determine the optimal 
farm structure outside any consideration of 
market mechanisms. Opinions also differ as to the 
widespread strategy of diversification of activities. 
This diversification is at once encouraged by 
types of support but also curbed by regulations 
which favour farming activities (OECD, 2009). 
Between these two, there exists a broad range of 
supports for investment in agriculture and in farm 
diversification activities to aid in the conversion of 
farm activities (for example, taking out vineyards, 
buying back quotas), for conversion or early 
retirement, as well as counselling, rural extension, 
diagnosis help, or restructuring (development 
plans). These measures are sometimes permanent, 
but they may also be temporary to limit adjustment 
consequences (social and economic costs) of a 
policy reform. In addition to the measures listed 
above, there are compensations for asset value 
losses and limited targeted decoupled income 
aids. Some examples of adjustment measures to a 
reform were assessed in an OECD study (2006b): 
the grain transportation reform in Western Canada 
(Box 1) and the milk sector reform in Australia 
(Box 2). Within this framework, early retirement The German Marshall Fund of the United States 60
programs for farmers and installation aid schemes 
in Ireland have also been assessed (Box 4).
At the European Union level, adjustment measures 
concern both permanent schemes that countries may 
include or not in their national (or regional) rural 
development programs (RDP)5 and specific reform 
targeted schemes (or at least additional financing). 
The restructuring of the sugar industry constitutes a 
recent example of reform adjustment. The Common 
Market Organisation (CMO) reform of the sugar 
industry, implemented in 2006, reduced guaranteed 
prices, eliminated the intervention system, and 
5 These are the schemes that define the implementation of the 
rural development regulation (RDR), also know as CAP 2nd 
pillar.
modified the quota system. It granted partial 
compensation to sugar beet growers, amounting 
to about 60% of the estimated income loss as an 
annual payment to be integrated into the annual 
single payment of the 2003 reform. The reform 
also sought to implement a voluntary restructuring 
scheme in return for the availability of funds 
for factory closures, compensation to sugar beet 
growers, for diversification measures in regions 
of member states affected by the reforms, and for 
transition measures (European Union Commission, 
press release IP/05/1473, 24 November 2005).
“Permanent” measures are financed by national or 
regional RDPs. Both deal with investment support 
to modernize farms, to help young farmers begin 
their activities, to adapt to new standards, improve 
Box 1. Western grain transportation reform 
in Canada
The Western grain transportation reform in 
Canada, implemented in 1995, consisted in the 
repeal of the Western Grain Transportation Act 
(WGTA) that eliminated payment of the Crow 
benefit to the railways for the movement of 
prairie grain towards ports and the amendment 
of the Canada Wheat Board (CWB) Act to 
change the price-pooling regime for prairie 
grains so that prices reflected real transportation 
costs. In order to assist the affected areas, the 
government implemented the Western Grain 
Transition Payments Program (WGTPP) to 
compensate landowners for the loss of the 
subsidy and the Western Grain Transportation 
Adjustment Fund to help industry adapt to the 
changes.
The WGTPP sought to compensate for the drop 
in land values that was expected to result from 
the elimination of the WGTA. This transition 
programme distributed a one-time capital 
payment of CAD 1.6 billion to landowners in 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and part of 
British Columbia. WGTPP was to be paid out 
in two instalments. Approximately 75% of the 
payments had been paid out by the summer of 
1996 and the remainder in the fall of 1996. The 
payment was based on a formula that considered 
number of acres, the productivity of the soil, 
whether or not the land was irrigated and the 
distance of the land from the nearest port (the 
closer of Vancouver or Thunder Bay).
Experience has shown that agriculture is a 
dynamic industry and that reform of policy 
can generate new challenges and opportunities. 
When these subsidies were removed, farmers 
and others in the industry responded quickly to 
market signals through a diversification of crop 
patterns, an increase in livestock production, 
and investments in value-added processing. 
Source: Extracts from OECD (2006b).2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 61
Box 2. Australia dairy industry  
adjustment policy
In 2000, manufacturing milk price support (the 
DMS scheme) terminated along with all fluid 
milk applicable regulations. Simultaneously, the 
government announced implementation of a 
three component AUD 1.78 billion restructuring 
packaging: 
•	The	Dairy	Structural	Adjustment	Program	
(DSAP) for all dairy producers,
•	A	Dairy	Exit	Program	(DEP)	to	assist	
farmers exiting the industry; and
•	The	Dairy	Regional	Adjustment	Program	
(DRAP) to manage the flow-on effects for 
regional dairy communities.
The restructuring grants had two payment 
components of 46.23 Australia cents per liter 
for fluid milk and around 8.96 Australian cents 
per liter for manufacturing milk. This ensured 
DSAP assistance was targeted according to the 
loss of support under each policy arrangement. 
DEP was a ‘safety-net’ assistance program 
designed to assist farmers in serious financial 
difficulty. It was open to applications for two 
years and successful applicants had to cancel 
their DSAP entitlements. Acceptance of a DEP 
grant required producers to sell their dairy farm 
and withdraw from agricultural production for 
five years.
DRAP objective was to create employment 
opportunities in dairy dependent communities 
that were adversely affected by deregulation. 
There were concerns about the regional 
economy effects of lower farm incomes, 
farmer retirements and plant closures. The 
program was designed to supplement local 
business investment initiatives. Individuals or 
groups could apply for grants to help establish 
alternative activities. Some dairy companies 
obtained grants to support plant redevelopments 
and other business activities. DRAP funds were 
also used to support infrastructure projects, 
retraining initiatives and counselling services in 
badly affected regions.
The effects of the reform were harsher than 
expected and additional funds were poured into 
the DRAP and DSAP schemes in the end of 
2000.
One of the main features of deregulation of the 
Australian dairy industry was removal of all 
price support measures over-night. It caused 
an immediate, substantial decline in average 
returns. In the lead-up to deregulation farmers 
were unsure about the nature and implications 
of the reform. Producers had 9 months warning 
after the decision was announced to consider 
their situation and make on-farm adjustments. 
The industry has adjusted rapidly to the effects 
of deregulation. The adjustment package has 
helped producers to make the transition. In 
addition, world prices for dairy products were 
high which considerably helped the transition by 
increasing export returns.
The adjustment response of most interest is 
the reaction of producers who specialised in 
fluid milk sales. Some have retired from the 
industry. Those who remained in the industry 
experienced a substantial drop in average 
returns. These producers have made adjustments 
to their farming operations to off-set the 
decline in farm income. One of the features 
of this assistance package was that it includes 
both support to the producers to exit from the 
sector and to stay in the sector. The adjustment 
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quality and innovation in agribusiness, and to aid 
professional training including changing professions, 
counselling, producers’ organisations, and early 
retirement (see Box 4 for early retirement from 
farming and Installation Aid Schemes in Ireland). 
Specific transitional measures to subsistence farms 
and aid for the creation of producer groups are 
available to the countries that joined the EU in 2004. 
Most of these adjustment measures are included 
in Axis I of the RDR measures to improve the 
competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry 
sectors (Box 3). Some measures, such as those 
aimed at modernising agricultural holdings, 
setting up young farmers or early retirement, 
have been implemented for many years at the 
community and national levels. They were 
originally called “structural measures” (not to be 
mistaken with regional or structural funds which 
are not specific to agriculture), but in 1992 were 
included in the so-called accompanying measures 
that later became part of the 2000-06 programme, 
then in the 2007-13 programme of the RDR. 
Two other axes concern rural development and 
environment improvement (axis 2), and rural 
economic diversification and living standards in 
rural zones (axis 3). The regulation allocates a 
minimum of 10% of RER funds for Axis 1 and 2,  
and 25% for Axis 3.
When looking at the share of Axis 1 in the PDR 
2007-13 expenses, significant differences appear 
between EU countries (Figure 1). Generally, the 10% 
lower limit is greatly exceeded. In five countries, 
the share is under 20%; in five others, it ranges 
between 20 and 30%. France belongs to the eight 
countries that grant between 30 and 40% of its 
PDR funds to Axis 1 measures. Among the nine 
countries that grant over 40% of the funds to Axis 
1 are new member states, but also Greece, Portugal, 
and Belgium where this share exceeds 60%.
Aid measures to diversification are found in Axis 
3. In the previous RDP, these shares were variable, 
the amount varying by country (Figure 2).
How can policies be improved? 
The various policy evaluations made by OECD 
have led to recommendations for optimal 
policies to reach most efficiently the set 
objectives with minimal costs and production 
and trade distortions. OECD (2002 and 2008b) 
summarise many of these studies’ conclusions. 
This section will first outline what good 
practices are and what must be done to establish 
such policies. It will then propose specific 
recommendations to adjustment policies.
General recommendations for optimal policies
The principles in favour of agricultural policy 
reform, as stated in 1988 by the Ministers of 
Agriculture of OECD Member states, are: 
assistance helped those who decided to 
leave the sector but also helped to improve 
the viability of those farm enterprises that 
decided to remain in the sector. In general, 
producers reacted by increasing farm output. 
Farmers expanded their milking herds and in 
some cases increased land area. Changes in 
secondary input use improved the productive 
performance of the primary inputs. Carrying 
capacity increased through greater use of 
improved pastures, fertilizer and water 
inputs. Pasture management improved and 
livestock productivity (milk yields) gains have 
come from more supplementary feeding.
Source: Extracts from OECD (2006b).
Box 2. Australia dairy industry  
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Box 3. Measures included in Axis 1 for the 
improvement of the competitiveness of the 
agricultural and forestry sector
Measures support targeting the 
competitiveness of the agricultural 
and forestry sector shall concern:
a) Measures aimed at promoting knowledge 
and improving human potential through:
i) vocational training and information 
actions, including diffusion of 
scientific knowledge and innovative 
practises, for persons engaged in the 
agricultural, food and forestry sectors,
ii) setting up of young farmers,
iii) early retirement of farmers 
and farm workers,
iv) use of advisory services by 
farmers and forest holders,
v) setting up of farm management, farm 
relief and farm advisory services, as 
well as of forestry advisory services;
b) Measures aimed at restructuring 
and developing physical potential and 
promoting innovation through: 
i) modernization of agricultural holdings 
ii) improving the economic value of forests; 
iii) adding value to agricultural 
and forestry products;
(iv) cooperation for development 
of new products, processes and 
technologies in the agriculture and food 
sector and in the forestry sector; 
(v) improving and developing infrastructure 
related to the development and 
adaptation of agriculture and forestry; 
(vi) restoring agricultural production 
potential damaged by natural disasters and 
introducing appropriate prevention actions; 
c) Measures aimed at improving the quality 
of agricultural production and products by:
i) helping farmers to adapt to demanding 
standards based on Community legislation,
ii) supporting farmers who participate 
in food quality schemes,
iii) supporting producer groups for 
information and promotion activities for 
products under food quality schemes;
d) Transitional measures for the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia concerning:
i) supporting semi-subsistence agricultural 
holdings undergoing restructuring,
ii) supporting setting up of producer groups.
Source: Article 20 of Council Regulation 
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Figure 1. Share of axis 1 dedicated to competitiveness improvement  
in forestry and agricultural sector in the 2007-2013 RDP funds
Figure 2. Share dedicated to diversification aids in total PDR funds, 2006
See Box 1 for a list of measures included in Axis 1. 
Source: Agra Informa Ltd, Rural Europe, July 2008. European commission website.
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Box 4. The early retirement from farming 
and Installation Aid Schemes in Ireland
The overall objective of the ERS is to provide 
an income for older farmers who decided to 
stop farming and the aim is for them to be 
replaced by farmers who are able to improve 
the economic viability of their holdings. The 
average pension for the period to 31 December 
2002 was EUR 12 750 compared to an average 
of EUR 10 794 for the period 1994–99. The 
adequacy of the amount of the pension is 
a key element in assessing the effectiveness 
of the ERS and the absence of indexation is 
a major weakness in the measure. It seems 
that this is one of the reasons for low uptake. 
At the national level the low uptake and 
pronounced regional imbalance in uptake 
does suggest that the impact of the measure 
as national level will be less than envisaged. 
Even without incentives a certain number of 
farmers will give up farming and pass their 
farm over to an immediate family member. 
The question of to what degree this program 
accelerates the retirement process is difficult 
to assess and in the absence of a special 
survey there is no definitive data available 
to answer this question. It is likely that the 
measure is financing some transfers that 
would otherwise have occurred. Nevertheless, 
it is true that, to some extent, this program 
has accelerated the retirement process and 
has facilitated structural adjustment.
The Department of Agriculture and Food of 
Ireland has published an Expenditure Review 
of the Early Retirement Scheme, which has 
concluded that “recent studies have shown that 
the Scheme has had little effect on the structure 
of Irish agriculture”. If this is the case, a thorough 
review of the scheme would be warranted.
The Installation Aid scheme has four specific 
objectives: To encourage young people to 
take up a career in farming; To ensure that 
such young people reach a high standard of 
agricultural education within a reasonable 
period following the date of set-up; To defray 
the set-up costs of eligible applicants setting 
up in farming for the first time during the 
period of operation of the Scheme; To make 
provision, in certain limited cases, for an 
element of working capital for farmers who 
are eligible to participate in the Scheme. The 
scheme provides a flat one-off premium of 
EUR 9 525 and is open to both full-time and 
part-time farmers. There is undoubtedly a large 
deadweight element, as many and probably 
most, of the recipients of the aid would take over 
the farm in any event. The level of the payment 
is probably not sufficient to be a key factor 
in determining whether a person would or 
would not enter farming. A main contribution 
of the scheme appears to be that it encourages 
participation in education by people who will 
take over farms. A simpler way to achieve this 
goal would be to simply pay farmers a grant 
on the completion of an educational course. 
Increased participation in agricultural education 
should certainly increase the quality of the 
labour and management resource on farms. 
There may also be an issue of integration 
and consistency between these programs, 
as one favours exit from the sector and the 
other is implemented to attract labour into 
it. These two schemes could complement 
each other in the sense that both schemes 
aim to increase the number of young farmers 
in the sector. However they are separately 
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transparency of objectives, costs, advantages 
and identification of winners and losers of 
reforms; aid targeting of specific objectives, 
production decoupling, adaptation of efforts 
to targeted results, flexibility and equity. 
The following recommendations 
concern all stages of defining policies 
and their implementation process.
Establishing objectives
A market failure that would justify public 
intervention must be identified and objectives 
must be established according to the 
situation and to the demands of society. 
managed and there are separate conditions 
for eligibility, such as the definition of 
what constitutes a ‘young’ farmer.
Furthermore, it seems that there is a possible 
inconsistency between the objectives of the 
two programs—one designed to remove 
labour from agriculture in order to improve 
economic viability for those who remain 
in the sector by, in the case of Ireland, 
increasing the farm size and the other, 
designed to attract labour into the sector. 
They should, therefore, be more closely 
integrated both in terms of their objectives 
and of scheme terms and conditions.
Source: Extracts from OECD (2006b).
Box 4. The early retirement from farming 
and Installation Aid Schemes in Ireland 
(Continued)
Consider all possible solutions,  
including non-intervention
We should first consider how the functioning 
of the market can be improved, for example by 
competition policies or by improvements to the 
market infrastructure. It is also necessary to 
consider whether the problem falls within the 
domain of agricultural policy or if other non 
sectoral actions are wiser, such as social or tax 
measures in the case of low income problems. 
Establishing target variables
If an agricultural measure is deemed necessary 
to reach a specific goal, the choice of target 
variables (level of intervention) is an essential 
step. There are several dimensions to targeting: 
•	Eligibility	criteria	that	define	potential	




terms, at quantitative and qualitative levels.
The relevance and the precision of targeting 
depend mainly on the scale of the problem 
and on transaction costs (OCDE, 2007b). 
To implement a targeted measure on an adjustment 
objective, such as improvement of labour mobility, 
for example, to help farmers of non viable farms 
to leave the agricultural sector, first requires that 
the population concerned be identified, then 
eventually grant a single payment and retraining 
courses to those who accept to quit farming. 
Comparing alternative approaches
Various alternatives that allow these objectives 
to be fulfilled should then be assessed ex ante 
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and benefits, as well as to identify the winners 
and losers. Whenever possible, all costs and 
benefits should be taken into account, including 
transaction costs, positive and negative 
externalities, and negative consequences on trade. 
We must also consider the brakes to reform 
and the contradictions with policies already 
implemented (for example, the role of institutions 
such as semi public organisations, producer 
groups, land and tax laws). The lack of policy 
consistency is a widespread problem. 
Choosing the implementation mechanism
The institutions best able to implement the policy 
must then be chosen (public, private, semi public, 
with both a national and local administration level) 
according to the network in place and the  
policy range. 
There are also various implementation mechanisms 
such as contracts. The choice of beneficiaries may 
be subjected to project appraisal (development 
plan). Some mechanisms, such as auctions, 
may facilitate the choice of beneficiaries. These 
issues are examined in OECD (2007b).
Follow up and assessment 
The implementation of a policy must be regularly 
monitored and its parameters adapted if necessary. 
It is also essential that ex post results of a policy 
be assessed in order to learn lessons for the future. 
The follow-up and assessment process should 
provide relevant information for the development 
of future policies and for the analysis of economic 
phenomena in general (OCDE, 2007c).
OECD recommendations on reform adjustment
In addition to the general recommendations on 
cost efficiency, targeting, decoupling or policy 
consistency mentioned above, specific conclusions 
were drawn from policy assessments of adjustment 
reforms (summarized extracts from OECD, 
2006b to follow). In particular, policymakers 
should verify that targeted adjustment 
measures, if their implementation is required for 
economic efficiency or public economy, be:
•	Linked	to	precise	deadlines	with	
a well defined exit strategy,
•	Oriented	towards	re-employment	of	those	 
who lost their job, and 
•	Compatible	with	general	social	 
protection systems.
Policymakers should consider the capacity of the 
sector to adapt to new circumstances when they 
design reforms. Indeed, reform studies show that 
producers can create new opportunities when 
changes occur. Therefore, adjustment measures 
must be designed to allow the private sector to 
create new opportunities in such situations.
Adjustment measures must be oriented to precise 
goals and reach the right targets. They must also 
be largely decoupled from production and use of 
agricultural products in order to limit distortions. 
Policymakers should decide whether adjustment 
measures should focus on upstream or downstream 
activities, or whether general measures on 
retraining or redeployment of resources in the 
endangered sector are enough. More generally, and 
from the economic policy point of view and taking 
equity into account, policymakers should carefully 
consider who will benefit from subsidies and who 
will finance them in every adjustment programme. 
When several support programs to adjustment are 
to be developed, their consistency and integration 
must be ensured. In the case of Ireland cited in 
Box 4, the early retirement and settling scheme 
were not completely integrated. For a scheme to 
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with the entry and exit policies being consistent 
and coordinated with one another. If the objective 
aims at training, this would be achieved more 
efficiently through a specific and targeted measure. 
Deadlines for programs should be clearly defined. 
If not, they may hinder the adjustment they 
are designed to help. A farmer compensation 
measure for price or income drop due to a 
reform or liberalisation action may have the 
opposite effect to the ones expected if it lasts 
for too long a period of time. Moreover, it is 
extremely difficult to terminate a programme 
that has no time limit. Finally, the longer it 
lasts, the more new distortions it may create. 
When land prices drop because of a reform, 
loss may be compensated to help the reform be 
accepted and to ensure equity (OCDE, 2007a). 
All adjustment programs must have an explicit 
part dedicated to cessations of business to increase 
the adjustment schemes’ chances of succeeding. 
Allowing those unable to be competitive to leave 
the agricultural sector through retirement is a 
potential strategy. There are examples of farmers 
connected to the general social security scheme, as 
well as examples of special farmer pension schemes. 
Policymakers can also propose temporary lump 
sum payments conditioned by cessation of business. 
To conclude, adjustment programs can also plan 
training schemes to help retrain farmers who 
leave the agricultural sector. Many adjustment 
mechanisms aim at helping farmers remain 
in business by improving the viability and 
competitiveness of their agricultural holding. 
Nevertheless, such mechanisms should not 
encourage them to diversify into activities that 
are already strongly supported elsewhere. 
The efficiency of the various measures will 
depend on the targeted sector’s characteristics 
and the nature and quality of the basic resources. 
Policymakers may choose amongst a large variety 
of measures, some oriented towards the producers 
themselves and others of a more general nature. 
Among the formers are loan renegotiation, 
subsidies, as well as many kinds of technical 
assistance. Infrastructures development, quality 
improvement programs and promotional and 
marketing schemes count among the latter. 
For an adjustment process to be successful, 
the people involved must be convinced of the 
irreversible characteristics of the reforms proposed 
and of the time limitation of the provided subsidies. 
Obviously, one-time measures or multiannual 
plans based on well known dispositions can be 
realized more easily than decisions taken year 
after year. Policymakers must therefore clearly 
explain their intentions, with transparency and, 
insofar as the political situation allows it, stick to 
the planned reform and adjustment measures. The 
preliminary planning and review process must 
limit risks of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Thorough studies undertaken before reform 
implementation and after the adjustment period 
help anticipate the effects of planned reforms 
and, therefore, identify fields in which difficulties 
may arise and where actors may be prejudiced. 
Adjustment measures should be designed and 
targeted with full knowledge of the facts. Though 
it is impossible to anticipate all consequences, 
the risk of granting too significant subsidies 
or to ill distribute them is greater when no 
studies have been undertaken. The impact of the 
reform on other sectors must also be anticipated 
and we must be aware of potential social and 
environmental costs that may arise. Furthermore, 
further assessing the measures during and after 
their implementation allows to draw lessons 
from the experiment and to use the latter in 
a potential reform of the targeted mechanism 
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For the desired adjustments to take place, 
an efficient review process must be planned, 
taking into account both the beneficiaries of 
the reform and those who will lose the most.
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“Markets often take care of the interactions between 
agriculture and the environment. However, markets 
are partially or totally inefficient when “public” 
goods are involved. How can we estimate the value 
of particular public goods, in order to distinguish 
primary and secondary concerns? This is a particular 
difficulty in Europe, where civil society groups tend 
to have widely divergent opinions on such topics. 
How can we devolve operating (regulatory and 
budgetary) competences among local, national and 
European levels? What should be the architecture 
for the various Single Farm Payments?”
Summary
Agriculture has been multifunctional since it 
was first practiced, producing food, feed, fibre 
and fuel and power. So what is new (if anything) 
is the use of the term and concept to justify 
continued support for farmers and farming. 
The conventional argument in favour of such 
support is articulated in the brief—markets fail 
in the presence of externalities and/or public 
goods—so government (public) support/
intervention is necessary to correct these failures.
Markets fail because property rights are ill-defined 
or unprotected, and/or because the transactions 
costs (associated with the necessary negotiations 
and exchange between provider and beneficiaries) 
exceed the net benefits (surplus) generated by 
resolving the failure. However, if government 
intervention does not, either directly or indirectly, 
resolve the transactions cost or property right 
problems, there is no reason to suppose that the 
intervention can be any better than the failure it 
seeks to remedy. In particular, there is no reason 
1 Professor of Agricultural Economics at Newcastle University.
to suppose that uniform payments to farmers or 
farms (as with the current Single Farm Payments) 
can possibly reconcile the different interests of 
the providers of CARE (conservation, amenity, 
recreation and environmental) goods and services, 
with the ‘consumers’, (the beneficiaries and valuers 
of the public goods or externalities) effective 
demands for these services. This ‘solution’ to 
the multifunctional problem, however targeted 
by compliance conditions, simply side-steps the 
fundamental problem; it does not solve it.
Introduction
The term “multifunctional” appears to have been 
recently relegated to a more minor role in the 
rhetoric surrounding the Common Agricultural 
Policy. The term appears only once throughout 
the European Commission’s web pages which 
‘explain the Common Agricultural Policy’, under 
the heading ‘promoting sustainable agriculture 
in a global environment’, where it is noted that 
“during the coming years the CAP will change 
further in order to continue to: (inter alia) 
support the multifunctional role of farmers 
as suppliers of public goods to society.” 
The conventional argument in favour of such 
support is articulated in the brief  —markets fail 
in the presence of externalities and/or public 
goods—so government (public) support/
intervention is necessary to correct these 
failures. The reasons why markets fail are: 
•	Property	rights	are	ill-defined—it is not 
clear who owns pretty landscapes or diverse 
wildlife, and hence it is difficult to identify 
the appropriate bargains between those who 
are capable of providing these goods and 
services and those who value their provision; 
•	Transaction	costs	are	prohibitive—the 
time and effort needed to include all the 
beneficiaries in negotiations to determine 2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 71
how much particular provisions are 
worth, and to collect the subscriptions and 
organize for the delivery with the providers, 
are just too great to be worthwhile.
Nevertheless, it is argued that people do generally 
value these conservation, amenity, recreation and 
environmental goods and services (CARE), which 
may also include particular cultural activities and 
characteristics of an agrarian society. These are 
valuable and worth paying for, lest they decline or 
disappear. Therefore, the conventional argument 
continues, it is worth paying farmers a supplement 
on top of their market returns to encourage the 
provision of these CARE goods and services.
The nature of Care (multifunctional services)2 
Careful consideration of multifunctionality 
quickly reveals that both the supplies of and the 
demands for the variety of different functions 
which agriculture, land management and 
land use both do and could generate are: 
•	Spatially	differentiated	and	highly	specific	
to local conditions and practices; 
•	Highly	dependent	on	current	personal	
preferences and future aspirations on 
both the supply and demand sides; 
•	In	a	continual	condition	of	change	
and adaptation over time. 
Three policy implications follow 
immediately from this consideration:
i) Uniform payments, authorized at the 
European or even national levels, cannot 
possibly match willingness to pay for 
2 These arguments are developed in Harvey, 2003, “Agri-
environmental relationships and Multi-functionality: Further 
Considerations”, World Economy, 26 (5), May, 705–725.
multifunctional products of farming with 
the differentiated costs of their provision;
ii) Attempts to identify and measure the 
social value of these attributes of agriculture 
will always be highly contestable and 
heavily dependent on the particular and 
local conditions under which measurement 
is undertaken, however sophisticated 
applied economic analysis becomes;
iii) Attempts to provide such ‘political 
administrative’ solutions to the problem 
run very high risks of both failing to resolve 
the transactions and property right issues 
(and hence failing to solve the problem 
at all) and also of generating additional 
transaction and property right problems 
of their own—a double jeopardy. 
We are in danger of repeating the mistakes of the 
past, though in a different guise. We have found 
that our original concerns about the security of our 
food supplies and the incomes of our farmers led 
us to develop and pursue policies which generated 
unsalable surpluses and higher cost farming, with 
little real effect on farm incomes. Now, perhaps, 
we are in equal danger of developing policies to 
provide for Care of the countryside which turn out 
to be both excessive in the amount of Care provided 
and the cost of its delivery, or fail to provide 
enough Care or the right types and mixes of Care. 
In short, the answers to the questions 
posed in the brief are:
i) How can we estimate the value of particular 
public goods, in order to distinguish primary 
and secondary concerns? We cannot, with any 
degree of confidence, general acceptability 
or consistency over space and time. Such 
estimates as can be made, however carefully, 
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location, context and populations surveyed 
or examined, and cannot be relied upon to 
provide reliable and robust estimates of the 
values of care through time, especially if 
the estimation technique does not actually 
require respondents or participants to meet 
their bids and pay the costs of provision;
ii) How can we devolve operating (regulatory and 
budgetary) competences among local, national 
and European levels? Again, we cannot design 
any ‘planned’ or administrative provision 
of appropriate levels of multifunctionality 
effectively and efficiently. There is no systematic 
framework which allows for this possibility. 
Nevertheless, there is little if any justification 
for financial co-responsibility for the provision 
of Care across the EU as a whole. If the Single 
Farm Payment, with its condition that land 
be maintained in Good Agricultural and 
Environmental Condition, is to be justified as 
a Care payment—then it should be regionally 
and nationally differentiated, and paid for 
(very largely) by those who benefit from the 
Care provision—typically the nationals of the 
country concerned. Multifunctional (Care) 
delivery is clearly local—even administrative 
regions in Europe exhibit a range of different 
socio-natural environments and habitats, 
so the provision of Care, and the costs of 
delivery, varies even within regions. Although 
the relevant demand can only be identified 
for a particular and specific package of local 
Care, it may well be expressed by more 
than local inhabitants, and include demand 
from both nationals and others. There is 
no necessary correspondence between 
administrative regions and the ‘markets’ for 
care, so there is no obvious regulatory or 
budgetary competence at any specific level 
in Europe. However, at least for supply, the 
implication is that the local level is likely to be 
the most competent for delivery—though not, 
necessarily, for specification and payment.
iii) What should be the architecture for the 
various Single Farm Payments? Given the 
previous answers, there is NO architecture 
available for administered Single Farm 
Payments which can hope to provide 
appropriate (socially optimal or even 
consistently acceptable) multifunctionality. 
Even at the most basic level, any given Single 
farm payment, even if specific to a single 
farm, to can only be a second-best answer to 
the problem of Care provision, since even a 
single farm is capable of providing a range of 
multi-functional services. Certainly, there is no 
reason to suspect that the payments will be the 
same for all farms, even within a given region. 
Nor is there any reason to suppose that the 
payments necessary to secure the appropriate 
provision of Care from any farm will bear 
any relationship at all to the levels of support 
provided to these farms under the previous 
systems of commodity market support.
An answer to multifunctionality—
the provision of CARE
There are, in fact, two major issues here: first, 
the CARE problem: how to develop socio-
political processes and procedures to deal with 
multifunctional farming and the provision of 
CARE goods and services; second, the Dependency 
problem: how to get there from here (from a 
system which has delivered, and, by implication, 
promised to go on delivering support to European 
farmers because they are European farmers).
Consider the Dependency problem first (see 
Harvey, 20043). Single Farm Payments are the 
3 “Policy Dependency and Reform: Economic gains versus 
political pains,” Agricultural Economics, 31 (2–3), December, 
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(final?) incarnation of a history of farm support 
within the EU, and encapsulate the benefits of this 
support to the European farm sector. Elimination 
of this support would, especially if done overnight, 
cause substantial problems for the current farm 
population, and is, as a consequence, very difficult 
for European politicians to contemplate, and 
also potentially very inefficient in terms of the 
additional adaptation and adjustment costs which 
such elimination would generate. Since farmers 
have taken production and investment decisions 
on the assumption that such payments would 
continue, they need the capacity to adjust and adapt 
to conditions in which they no longer exist. In 
short, they need and deserve some compensation/
adjustment assistance for removal of support. 
The cleanest, easiest and most efficient and effective 
way of providing this assistance, as well as the 
appropriate signals for the necessary adjustment, 
is the lump sum payment (CAP Bond).4 The SFP, 
given the inability of the European Government 
to issue a Bond (or borrow money for a lump-
sum compensation payment), is perhaps the 
closest practical alternative to the CAP Bond. In 
this sense, the SFP is best seen as compensation 
for the reduction (and eventual elimination?) of 
commodity or area based support. To dress this 
payment up as a payment for multi-functionality 
(Care) is to thoroughly confuse the issue.
If the SFP is actually compensation for elimination 
of market support, then it is necessarily finite. 
Not only are the individual payments limited, but 
also they should only be allowed to continue for 
long enough to provide the necessary adjustment 
assistance towards a free market. There is no long-
term case for continued compensation. European 
Agriculture is not inherently disadvantaged relative 
to international competition, and is perfectly 
4 A. Swinbank and R. Tranter (eds): A Bond Scheme for CAP 
Reform, CABI, 2004.
capable of surviving and prospering alongside 
imports from elsewhere. Although there is clearly 
some public sympathy for arguments in favour of 
self-sufficiency—that our own supplies of food are 
more reliable, more deserving of support, of better 
quality and provenance than competing sources 
from elsewhere—the idea of self-sufficiency is 
actually self-defeating. No individual household is 
content to be self-sufficient, for the simple reason 
that they can be much better off trading what they 
are relatively good at for goods and services which 
would otherwise be very expensive in time and 
effort for it to provide for itself. The same logic 
applies exactly to localities, regions and countries. 
No doubt, the larger the community considered—
up to the scope of the present European Union—
the more opportunities there are for profitable 
trade within the borders, and (possibly) the 
smaller the gains to be made from extending 
trade beyond the community boundaries. But, 
even at this level, trade is still more sensible and 
sustainable than self-sufficiency, especially in a 
world faced with the prospect of feeding another 
3bn people within 40 years. As societies and their 
markets become richer and more sophisticated, 
there are increasing opportunities for people to 
express and exercise their own preferences for local 
products and services, and more niches in which 
these activities can flourish. There is no longer 
any justification for supposing that European 
agriculture needs special treatment or support 
simply because it produces food (or feed, fibre 
and fuel). This logic says clearly that the SFP (as 
compensation) should be phased out. Since the 
present policy is only legitimized to 2013, it makes 
some sense to terminate the SFP at that date.
What about the CARE problem? Markets deal with 
‘multifunctionality’ in both supply and demand far 
more effectively than any administrative system yet 
devised or conceived—markets are simply fantastic 
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widely different individual valuations of goods and 
services and transmitting these to an almost equally 
wide variety of actual and potential suppliers, and 
matching the one with the other. Market failure is, 
then, a serious problem. Except, that is, where it is 
these markets themselves which ‘decide’ that the 
additional satisfaction to be gained from dealing 
with these failures simply does not warrant the 
extra effort and cost involved in internalizing 
the externalities, and collective organization of 
public goods. In this sense, ‘market failure’ is the 
wrong label—the market doesn’t fail as such, it 
simply says that the effort to deal with the issues 
is not worthwhile. But, if the transactions costs 
can be reduced—encouraging those willing to pay 
for the various functions of farming to pay for 
the services of farmers and land users—then we 
could expect satisfactory quasi-market solutions. 
How might we do this? By encouraging voluntary 
organizations (Conservation, Amenity and 
Recreation Trusts, CARTS)5 to elicit and collect 
consumer and constituent willingness to pay for 
particular packages of multifunctionality in specific 
places, and for them to organize the delivery from 
farmers and land users. But, surely, this approach 
is already available? It is already being used, as a 
prime example, by the British Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds, but not to a sufficient 
extent. Why not? For two major reasons: first, the 
free rider problem—too many people chose to 
free ride on the rather small provision generated 
by voluntary action; second, the Dependency 
problem (above)—people have got used to 
governments being the vehicle through which 
these problems are solved, and have yet to grow 
accustomed to thinking and acting for themselves 
through charitable trusts and voluntary action.
The first of these problems is relatively simple 
to overcome—simply estimate the extent of the 
5 Dwyer, J.C. and Hodge, I, Countryside in Trust, Wiley, 1994.
free-rider problem: is it likely to lead to a 50% 
underfunding, or 80% or 100%, of the CARE 
services? Then provide from the public purse 
a grant-in-aid payment to each of the trusts to 
make good the free-rider shortfall. The only 
administrative effort necessary would be an 
ombudsman/auditor function to make sure 
that the trusts so aided were legitimate Care 
providers. Incidentally, this approach could also 
be used to allow for the ‘merit’ good arguments 
in favour of support for multifunctionality.6
The second problem, dependency, is much 
more difficult, as any addict well knows. A 
radical solution might be to allow all voluntary 
contributions to be fully tax-deductable (to 
be allowed as deductions from tax owed), to 
encourage people to act for themselves, rather 
than relying on government to do the job. 
However, further consideration of this approach 
quickly leads to the obvious possibilities of 
‘excessive’ voluntary contributions, merely to 
avoid paying any tax at all. Clearly there would 
need to be upper limits to tax deductibility, if 
this approach to government organization of 
collective good provision remains limited to 
multifunctional services, rather than extend to 
many other forms of present government activity.
Of course, this is a radical departure from our 
present systems of governance. It is clearly widely 
believed that ‘farming is different’, and is ‘more 
than economics’—that it is far too important 
to be left entirely to the market. Farming is, 
according to this belief, necessarily and inherently 
political, demanding and requiring specific 
political treatment (and support) “reflecting 
6 Merit goods are frequently confused with public goods, but 
are different. Merit goods (and services) are those which society 
judges to be too important to be left to the market to provide, 
since markets work according to willingness to pay, disadvantag-
ing those who are poor and not able to pay. Classic examples are 
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the expectations of society as a whole.”7 The 
problem can be re-stated as one of questioning 
the competence of our political systems to take 
collective decisions on our (the constituents) behalf. 
In so doing, it is clear that an alternative which 
offers release from the political straightjacket, or 
threatens to eliminate the politics, depending on 
one’s point of view, is likely to raise considerable 
opposition—we have grown dependent on our 
politics to take decisions for us when private action 
does not deliver what we want. And, because of 
this dependency, we do not easily appreciate or 
welcome suggestions that our reliance is misplaced 
and that there are potential alternatives. Fear or 
mistrust of novel ideas may also play a part in a 
natural antipathy towards radical suggestions.
Furthermore, it is clear that people, and even 
‘countries’, show different levels of respect and trust 
for their present political machinery. Those who 
hold present political machines in high regard can 
see no point in questioning their ability to deliver 
and implement the ‘right and proper’ balance of 
multifunctional activities, structures, goods and 
services. These people, and countries, therefore, see 
no reason to question the capacity and competence 
of their political machinery, and see no reason why 
SFPs cannot and should not be used to pay farmers 
to deliver the Care that society wants, which, in 
turn, will be perfectly adequately determined 
and delivered through the conventional political 
machines. For such people, the conventional 
justification for continued SFPs, appropriately 
targeted and conditional on delivery of multi-
functionality and Care, is more than adequate.
Of course, these people (and countries) should 
rationally expect some opposition—which might 
well claim that the levels of care provision and 
the costs of delivery are not properly determined 
through the present political systems. Voters are too 
7 As one discussant remarked.
inclined to spend other peoples’ money, political 
interest groups are more extreme in their views and 
demands than the general constituencies, small 
but coherent groups and organizations (farmers, 
wildlife enthusiasts) can be more politically 
influential than large and more incoherent 
groups (citizens, consumers, constituents), whose 
members are affected relatively marginally by 
any action or policy. Administrators are neither 
providers of care, nor direct beneficiaries of the 
provision. As such, they have little incentive or 
competence, other than bureaucratic efficiency 
and organization, to monitor constituents’ 
demands for care and providers’ capacities, 
especially at highly differentiated local levels.
Furthermore, it seems likely that the world 
faces the prospect of increasing real prices 
for both food and fuel, as it seeks to continue 
growth to feed a still growing population, and 
provide them with more decent standards of 
living. As this happens, so the appropriate trade-
offs between care and production will change. 
Bureaucracies are not well known for responding 
effectively or rapidly to changing circumstances 
and priorities, running the substantial risk of 
delaying response and exacerbating inappropriate, 
and possibly counterproductive activities.
However, notwithstanding these arguments, there is 
little doubt that many countries will not be willing 
to release agricultural multi-functionality to the 
uncertain and apparently uncontrollable quasi-
market place of competing trusts. Nevertheless, 
there can be little dispute that financial co-
responsibility across the European Union for 
payment for care—the sole justification for the 
successors to SFPs—is no longer justified and 
should be eliminated, to bring the “CAP” into line 
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co-financing by member states.8 The demand for 
care is largely (though not entirely) confined within 
national boundaries and does not (except in rare 
cases) extend throughout the Union. Even when it 
does, it also extends beyond the Union’s boundaries. 
Member states should be largely left to their own 
devices to service their demand for care, subject 
only to the competition policies of the EU. There 
is very little justification for a Europe-wide policy 
on this provision, still less for European funding.
Conclusions
Farming has been multifunctional—producing 
many different things people want and are willing 
to pay for—ever since it was first practiced 
by our ancestors. Furthermore, markets are 
the best device we have yet invented to solve 
multifunctional problems—after all, what is 
more multifunctional than having a life or 
earning a living? Attempts to solve the problem 
of agricultural multifunctionality through 
administration and Government are very likely to 
produce both inefficient and ineffective answers. 
Yet it seems likely that the Single Farm Payment 
will evolve into a targeted payment to farmers 
for their multifunctional services—their 
Care provision. As it does so, the justification 
for financial co-responsibility for the policy 
disappears—member states should pay for (and 
8 See Harvey, D. R., “The EU Budget and the CAP: An Agenda 
for the review?,” EuroChoices, 5 (1), 22–27, 2006. As a conse-
quence of the elimination of financial co-responsibility, the UK 
would, of course, be expected to give up her claim to the special 
rebate.
define, design and implement) their own Care 
programs, as they see fit, since uniform, pan-
European definition and design is necessarily and 
inherently beyond the competence of the European 
Union, simply because of the differentiated 
nature of Care provision and demand.
Once Care is made a national rather than an 
EU responsibility, there is no logical reason why 
individual member states should not be able 
to adopt different approaches and solutions, 
including the possibility of delegating organization 
of provision to Conservation, Amenity and 
Recreation Trusts (CARTs). Indeed, competition 
between member states over how to provide for 
appropriate levels of Care should be expected to 
identify those approaches and systems which are 
‘best fitted’ to the local conditions and aspirations.
The EU role in such a system would then be 
confined to: regulating competition between 
member states, to ensure that states do not seek 
to distort competition in food, feed, fibre and 
fuel markets; promoting economic development, 
including rural development; promoting cohesion 
between regions; promoting R&D to develop and 
expand the potential of European agriculture 
and land as multi-productive resources.2020 European Agriculture: Challenges & Policies 77
Agriculture and Risk Management
Per Molander1
Introduction
Risks are omnipresent in human life and some 
strategies of protection are as old as mankind. In 
pre-industrial societies, regular risks prevail: war, 
famine, plague. The development of a modern 
society reduced or eliminated these classical 
risks while introducing new vulnerabilities—car 
accidents, remote market dependence, etc. In every 
sector, the risk overview is constantly changing. 
Therefore, risk management must follow this 
evolution and adapt itself to its environment. 
Many risks are settled everyday on an individual 
level. Most households buy a comprehensive 
insurance against fire, burglary, etc. Private 
savings are used in case of unexpected expenses. 
For some risks, however, decentralized 
solutions are inefficient, and insurances based 
on public intervention are better adapted. 
Therefore, a strategy adapted to a given sector 
must answer the following questions: 
•	What	are	the	most	important	risks	to	consider?
•	What	are	the	main	alternatives	
to manage these risks?
•	What	potential	market	failures	may	
require State interference?
Risks in the agricultural sector: An overview
Production Risks 
Meteorological risks (hail, storms, drought, 
frost, etc.), plant and domestic animal diseases 
belong to classical risks of the agricultural sector. 
1 Consultant at Mapsec, Stockholm and former analyst leader 
of agricultural policy reform in Sweden. Paper translated into 
English from the original French by Barbara Bender.
Consequences of meteorological variations depend 
on different factors—choice of plants or animals, 
microclimate conditions, soils, plant physiology, 
etc. Drought constitutes a risk not only in the 
Mediterranean area but also in the Baltic area, as 
well as in some regions along the Danube. Massive 
rainfalls occur mostly in Eastern Europe while frost 
increases in the North and in the East of the EU, 
with quite significant local variations.2 Sanitary 
risks are more difficult to locate. Epizootics often 
happen on large territories and counter measures 
can also affect regions exempted from the disease. 
From the consumer’s point of view, threats 
from classical risks are now obviously less 
important than before. In the 1860s–70s in 
Scandinavia, poor citizens could die of starvation 
after a bad crop. This risk has been eliminated 
thanks mostly to higher productivity in the 
agricultural sector, but also—which is even more 
important—thanks to the general economic 
development based on a free international 
trade that allows to import commodities like 
chemical fertilizers and food products. 
From the producer’s point of view, classical 
risks represent, indeed, a real threat. It is an 
overview in constant change, that includes the 
perspectives of climate change, avian flu, etc. 
Market risks
In every market, price balance is gained by the 
interaction between supply and demand, and 
changes in one or the other implies variation 
of prices. Variation of prices is therefore 
natural; no variations, however, would require 
an explanation. Nevertheless, these common 
variations of prices are sometimes viewed as 
unacceptable, and prices are then administratively 
managed. This occurs for employment markets 
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in most industrialized countries. It works the 
same for agricultural products in the European 
Union and other countries of the OECD. As 
a consequence, somehow paradoxical, the 
variation of producers’ income increases more 
when variations are natural because these latters 
are dimmed by price variations—which go on 
the opposite—in a non-regulated market.
Political Risks 
Political changes may directly affect the 
agricultural sector (subsidies, import restrictions, 
environmental policies, etc.) or indirectly (tax 
policies, transfers to households, etc.). The first 
category of changes is the most interesting for 
the present discussion since the agricultural 
sector is quite similar to the other economic 
sectors, with regard to indirect effects.
For historical reasons, the agricultural sector is 
highly regulated in most of the industrialized 
countries, leading naturally to political risks: 
increased security in terms of commercial 
risks involves increased exchange of political 
risks. It is also the alternative to a sector more 
devoted to consumer’s demand and normal 
economic conditions should be implemented 
in that perspective. Moreover, political risks 
are radically different from regular risks 
in that it is impossible to set probabilities 
to the risks incurred and, therefore, it is 
more or less impossible to insure them.
Human Risks
There are, in the agricultural sector, as in all 
economic sectors, risks affecting either owners 
or employees—diseases, accidents, change in 
family status, human capital depreciation, etc. The 
agricultural sector is then no different from other 
economic sectors and debating counter measures 
to implement must be made in a general context. 
There are strong arguments in favour of a public 
intervention in social security for employees, some 
of which are also pertinent for small entrepreneurs, 
but this issue is general and does not require 
specific debate for the agricultural sector. 
Risks threatening agricultural assets
A specific group of risks threatens agricultural 
assets—flood, fire, ground water contamination, 
etc. The limit, here, lies between risks threatening 
an individual enterprise—risks requiring no 
other counter measure than a conventional 
insurance—and collective risks like floods or, 
ultimately, radioactive fallouts, that can threaten 
the production capacity of a whole region. In the 
latter case, the State is obviously the natural insurer. 
Financial Risks
Financial risks represent a sub-category of market 
risks. As in other types of risks, there are general 
risks—as in the variations of interest rates—and 
specific risks—as in the variations of tenant 
farming. The level of this latter should be adjusted 
to the effective soil yield, creating an automatic 
mechanism of adaptation. However, the possibility 
of too long renewal intervals according to the 
price variations may impede the process. The 
question to determine whether it would be a real 
problem or not depends on the general legal frame. 
For example, legislation on contracts in Sweden 
allows each party to re-open the negotiations if 
the external conditions under which the contract 
has been signed have changed significantly. 
The agricultural sector: An exception?
Some of the above mentioned risks are specific 
to the agricultural sector, but others are general. 
The main issue for a sectoral risk policy is to 
determine whether the range of risks justifies a 
public intervention. In other words, is the level 
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than in other similar sectors? And does this 
characteristic of the risks differ from the other 
sectors’ in a way that requires a public intervention? 
Much has been written on “the specificity of 
agriculture” debating the characteristics of the 
agricultural sector vs. others sectors dominated 
by small and medium sized enterprises. Among 
the hypotheses, the following can be noted:
•	The	variability	of	meteorological	factor	
is higher than in other sectors;
•	The	output	turnaround	time	(sowing-
harvesting, investing in piglet-slaughtering) 
is specific to the agricultural sector;
•	The	stronger	capitalistic	intensity;
•	The	unusual	producers’	response	to	price	
variations (“inverse supply curve”);
•	General	conditions	in	a	sector	in	
contraction are particularly difficult;
•	Collective	services	produced	by	the	
sector—food security, environment-oriented 
services, etc.—are not well rewarded. 
These issues have been dealt with 
previously.3 In this paper, the analysis 
will only deal with risk management.
A variety of solutions
Various risk management solutions have been 
developed in different sectors of the economy. 
Some of these solutions are adapted to the 
specificities of the present sector, but there are a 
large number of strategies and tools that can apply 
to every sector. The choice between the existing 
solutions must be made according to the efficiency 
criteria, which is determined according to :
3 Molander (1993).
•	The	risk	nature: risks are known as 
independent if the probability that a 
producer will be hit is the same as if 
the other producers of a same product 
(or a similar product) will be hit or not; 
Otherwise, the risks are known as systemic.
•	The	risk	importance: The financial 
and administrative cost of a given 
solution is only justified if the risk 
does not exceed a certain level. 
•	The	existence	of	market	failures: in some 
situations, the market given solutions are not 
efficient, and a public intervention should be 
sought. However, it is not possible to draw 
the immediate conclusion that this public 
intervention is justified, because the State, as 
an insurer, does not always have access to the 
required information for the insurance to be 
efficient. Moreover, we must decide whether 
the advantages linked to a public intervention 
are higher than the administrative costs. 
•	The	issue	of	income	distribution.
Risk absorption
Variations of outputs and prices are traditional 
risks in the agricultural sector. In the past, the 
population had to adapt to annual variations. 
Nowadays, the interaction between producers 
and markets have made the traditional solution 
obsolete—farm stocks. Now, producers use 
financial means—savings and loans—to absorb 
variations. In many countries, tax law allows 
farmers to transfer income from one fiscal year to 
another in order to eliminate these variations as 
much as possible. Indeed, risk absorption at the 
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Trade as an insurance
Meteorological variations are more or less 
independent from one place to another. For 
example, hail is local. The larger the geographical 
area of potential risks, the more independent the 
variations. It allows to absorb climate risks by 
enlarging regional and global markets. Therefore, 
regional and international trade contributes to 
lessen the risks from the consumers point of 
view. Nevertheless, trade also gives possibilities 
to farmers. When a regional or national market 
shrinks, farmers may search for customers 
elsewhere. The settling of farmers abroad may 
also be analyzed as an insurance strategy that 
offers other possibilities as well, such as the 
development of new products and services. 
Diversification
The main goal of a household is to ensure a 
sufficient global income, a natural strategy 
against agricultural risks is to seek income 
outside this sector. In the past, farmers found an 
additional occupation in craft industry, or small 
scaled industrial activities. Nowadays, thanks 
to the transportation means, a large number of 
alternatives also lie in the urban sectors of the 
economy. Firstly, further income may be found 
using farmers’ competence or other farming 
assets, in horticulture, obviously, but also in 
further-related sectors. Tractors and other vehicles 
can be used for transportation, snow removal, 
excavation, etc. Tourism is a growing sector in 
rural economy. One of the parents in an farmers’ 
household may also have a job non- or little 
related to the agriculture—as teacher, driver, 
electrician etc. These solutions are obviously very 
efficient to stabilise households global income. 
The additional income contributes both to raise 
the level of household income and to lessen its 
vulnerability to a given level of variations.
Insurances
The simple idea of insurance is to share the 
risk linked to a given activity between all those 
affected by this risk. Typically, a large number of 
individuals take an equal risk associated to a high 
cost, but with a low probability. By sharing the 
risk, the affected individuals have to worry for 
medium risk only—a trifling cost compared to 
the maximum cost—and for the administrative 
cost necessary to manage the insurance. This 
approach works very well for insurable risks i.e. 
risks for which probabilities and costs associated 
to the various disasters are well known—such as 
fire, car accidents, etc. All these insurable risks 
are constantly developing: for example, today, 
there are insurances against the consequences of 
political assaults on the international market.
Typically, a number of factors tend to make 
things more complicated. First, all individuals do 
not face the same risks. For an insurance to be 
efficient, insurance premiums must be adapted to 
the different levels of risks. Therefore the insurer 
must have access to the relevant information 
about the policyholder, which is not always the 
case. The absence of premium adaptation to risks 
leads to the problem of adverse selection, i.e. 
individuals associated with the lowest levels of risk 
leave the insurance programme (too expensive 
for the risk threatening them). It compels the 
insurer to raise the premiums, thus risking to 
reduce the number of participants even more. 
To some extent, the market may disappear. 
Secondly, when risks are natural (for example 
meteorological risks), probabilities are usually 
independent from the policyholders’ behaviour. 
However, in other cases, risks may be affected by 
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known as moral hazard. In such a case, an 
insurance may induce policyholders to take 
more risks, obviously a counterproductive 
effect. The counter measure usually chosen 
to fight this effect is called a deductible. 
Harvest/crop insurance
The harvest insurance is a long established 
institution in many industrialized countries. The 
insurance protects against severe damages when 
weather conditions are bad. Insurable crops, as well 
as insurance parameters, such as minimum income 
insured according to the hectares involved, vary 
from one country to another. In some of them, the 
harvest insurance is managed by the government, 
but it is perfectly possible to manage an insurance 
fund on a strictly commercial basis. Sometimes, 
public intervention consists in just a tax subsidy. 
Anyway, it has to be deductible for the firm. 
Forward contracts 
Often, a product producer and buyer have 
a common interest in eliminating a risk. In 
the agricultural sector, quantities and prices 
on delivery date are usually unknown when 
the production is decided. Therefore, the two 
partners can conclude an asset sale agreement 
at a future price and date, stated in a contract 
called a forward contract. As there is no 
standardisation, such contracts are negotiated by 
mutual agreement between the two partners. 
A forward contract allows for eliminating 
most of the financial risk. However, there are 
some disadvantages. It is not possible, for the 
producer, to insure his entire crop as its quantity 
is unknown at the time the contract is made. If 
100 per cent of a regular crop is insured by the 
producer, and the real crop amounts to only 80 
per cent, he will have to buy the difference on 
the market which—in a time of shortage—may 
prove very expensive. Usually, 80 percent of the 
regular crop is insured in a forward contract. 
The second disadvantage is that forward 
contracts may generate risks of liquid assets. 
Due to the special conditions of the contract, 
it is very difficult to assess its position before 
the expiry date. Moreover, it is not before the 
expiry date that a potential failure of one of the 
partners can be noted. For these reasons, more 
standardised contracts—futures contracts—have 
replaced forward contracts as the main risk 
management tool at the international level. 
Nevertheless, forward contracts are often used 
between primary producers and merchants. 
Futures markets of financial tools4 
A futures contract is a standardised delivery 
contract in which quantity and quality of an asset 
(crop), expiry date and place of delivery are stated. 
Futures contracts are negotiated on an organised 
market, thanks to a standardised format. Their 
modern type was first used in the mid 19th century 
in the United States on the cereal market. They 
are very general and are used for a large number 
of commodities and basic products (oil, natural 
gas, gold, silver, etc.) as well as interest rates. 
The difference between futures markets and 
forward contracts lies in standardisation, the 
existence of a clearing house, with central 
counterparty. When buyer A buys a contract  
from seller B, he, in fact, buys from the clearing 
house, and B sells to the house. The risk 
management is thus centralised in the clearing 
house. To ensure this function, the clearing house 
requires a certain amount as an initial margin and a 
variation margin used to re-build the deposit if the 
latter has been reduced by the market variations. 
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The majority of the transactions covered by 
futures contracts are never realized. The reason 
is that these contracts are usually combined 
with options. An option allows for buying (call 
option) or selling (put option) a given quantity of 
underlying assets that can be stocks, commodities, 
futures contracts, etc. A producer who wants to 
sell all of his crop but can only be sure to be able 
to produce 80 percent of it can thus conclude a 
futures contract for 100 percent and, at the same 
time, a call option for 20 percent of the crop. 
These financial tools constitute a kind of insurance 
against market variations. What is remarkable, 
compared to regular insurances, is that this type of 
insurance does not require an insurance premium 
on top of the net administrative cost. At any 
time, the equilibrium price on a futures market 
represents a kind of average between highest and 
lowest prices. The fact that various actors make 
different forecasts is explained by the fact that some 
of them have personal sources of information or 
that they draw their own conclusions from the 
information available to everybody. As a result, 
some actors are ready to buy a certain quantity of 
call options at the equilibrium price because they 
think they can sell it higher; On the opposite, there 
are people ready to buy a certain quantity of put 
options at the equilibrium price because they think 
they can buy it cheaper than the market price. The 
closer we get to the expiry date, the clearer the 
real value of the various alternatives and buying/
selling tools are settled. However, only a tiny 
percentage of these physical transactions made on 
the market amounts to deliveries of the product. 
The State role
General motives 
Are potential market failures important enough 
to justify public intervention? To suitably answer 
this question, we must set a general frame. As 
market failures are well analyzed by economic 
analyses, we will only briefly examine them here.5 
Negative externalities 
Negative externalities are the most famous 
example of a market failure: an operator A is 
disadvantaged by actions linked to operator 
B without compensations. The negative 
consequences of an industrial production on the 
environment are typical examples of negative 
externalities. Without public intervention, being 
a restriction or a tax, negative externalities 
would create an inefficient resource allowance.
Collective goods
Externalities can also be positives. Agriculture and 
arboriculture represent activities producing mutual 
positive externalities. The asymmetric situation 
where someone produces a good that can benefit 
other actors without contribution is a problem 
as this good will not be produced in a sufficient 
amount to make the market efficient. In the worst 
situation, the good will not be produced at all. 
Infrastructure—roads, television etc.—is often 
considered a collective good, but the collective 
characteristics depend in some measure on the 
chosen technology. For example, it is possible to 
finance road investments by taxes, or limit the 
access to TV programs by using security keys. 
Long-term decisions 
The ideal market is based on the individual 
rationality idea. However, this can lead to 
inefficient decisions from a social point of view if 
they are decisions with very long term effects. A 
Swedish forest will be mature at the age of 80 to 
100 years, and those who plant a forest will thus be 
dead before they benefit from their investment. For 
5 See for example Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), Molander 
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this reason, it is a forest management law that must 
require that a felling area be reforested in order 
to ensure a sustainable management of forests. 
Availability of information 
The economic market theory lies on the fact 
that actors are well informed. This condition 
is not always satisfactory. Information can be 
bought like any other service but it is particular 
in the sense that the buyer does not know its 
value before buying. For this reason, some actors 
may find themselves in a market equilibrium 
characterised by poor information and, therefore, 
inefficient. To avoid such consequences, basic 
information must be required for consumers. 
Problems of autonomy 
Problems of autonomy are updated by alcohol and 
drugs and have no link with agricultural policies. 
Inefficient markets 
The basic model of market expects operators to 
be numerous, and the actions of any operator 
affect the market equilibrium only marginally. 
In some markets, there is a not inconsiderable 
risk of oligopoly or monopole. Such a situation 
will be characterised by a level of production too 
low and an level of prices too high according to 
a free and efficient market. Therefore, a market 
watch is a compulsory tool for economic policy. 
Inefficiencies can also rise from other 
unfavourable conditions. We have already 
mentioned problems associated with the 
production of insurances  —moral hazard, and 
adverse selection. None of these two problems 
justify in themselves a reason sufficient for a 
government intervention however. A specific 
analysis must then be made in each situation 
to check whether the reasons are sufficiently 
important to require legislative measures. 
The income redistribution’s policy 
Even if the market is inefficient, the income 
distribution can be considered as unacceptable, 
requiring a redistribution policy. What is 
most efficient in such situations is a general 
policy. A sectoral redistribution policy 
may end with an inefficient allocation of 
resources, drawing a large part of the capital 
and workforce to the sector involved. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation
Finally, there are arguments in favour of a 
government intervention, in policies linked 
with the economic climate. The debate on this 
topic is not relevant for the agricultural policy. 
Consequences for the agricultural policy
Negative externalities 
Negative externalities exist in the agricultural 
sector as in other economic sectors, and must be 
treated the same way—by taxes, restrictions etc. 
Collective goods
The agricultural sector produces various 
collective goods. Food security, in the case of 
a crisis or a war may justify specific measures 
of planning. During the reform of the Swedish 
agricultural policy in 1990, the government 
decided to ensure a level of oleaginous plants 
production satisfactory in the country. 
More important today is the system of contracts 
to ensure biodiversity linked to agricultural 
activities. The National Administration for the 
protection of environment in Sweden has signed 
a large number of agreements with individual 
producers in that purpose. The choice of the 
objectives of these contracts is based on a 
meticulous study of the present flora and fauna. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 84
The insurance market 
The ultimate producers’ purpose is to ensure as 
much as possible a stable enough income at a 
satisfactory level. In their opinion, the ideal would 
be an insurance able to secure this level of income. 
However, such global income insurance does 
not exist for any other category of entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, such a goal can not be achieved even 
if we’d like it as problems linked to moral hazards 
are too important. The State-Insurer would 
never have the information required to decide 
whether the client has made sufficient efforts to 
qualify for the given insurance. The only solution 
consists in considering the risks one after the 
other and finding partial solutions which, in their 
whole, would give a satisfactory global result. 
Regarding general risks—diseases or the producer’s 
accidents, fire, etc.—there are tools provided either 
by markets or by the social security system. For 
more specific risks, such as weather conditions, the 
situation is similar. Meteorological phenomenons 
are known well enough to allow a statistical 
analysis and a thorough calculation of premiums. 
Even for relatively important damages covered 
by the crop insurance, it is possible to create 
an institutional solution independent from the 
government as shown by Canadian and Swedish 
examples. It is only for disasters that government 
intervention is justified. The problem lies in 
defining unambiguously what “disaster” stands 
for and to state that definition ex ante; otherwise, 
private insurers will hesitate to sell insurances. 
The problem of moral hazard is very strong in the 
agricultural sector. For example, farmers may face 
different levels of risks according to their choice of 
crops, production methods, etc. Private insurers 
seem more able to solve this problem than the 
state because the formers will not hesitate to put 
deductibles to avoid farmers to take too high a 
risk. However, political pressures may encourage 
the government to subsidize this insurance, 
thus raising the level of risk in the sector.
However, the State seems more competent to 
solve the problem of adverse selection wherever 
it exists. The market tends to diversify premiums 
according to the farmers’ risks, which may not 
be wanted from the income distribution point 
perspective. On another hand, this risk does not 
seem very frequent in the agricultural sector. If 
there are very low income farmers, the appropriate 
solution would lie in a general subsidy within a 
social policy, to avoid affecting resource allowance. 
Farmers have recently been more sensitive to 
international price variations, which is new 
from the European point of view. It does not 
necessarily mean that income variations become 
more important since incomes are determined 
by the combined effects of prices and quantities. 
For producers who wish nevertheless to be 
insured against price variations, futures markets 
are effective tools. Obviously, these solutions 
require knowledge of financial markets, and it is 
understandable that farmers may rather concentrate 
on their companies’ activities. From there on, 
collective solutions seem a better alternative. It 
implies for the individual producer to seek simple 
solutions like the forward contract in relation to the 
merchant, when the latter—being a firm belonging 
to the farmers—use the more sophisticated 
tools of international markets. (see § 5.5). 
Summary
Finally, all arguments in favour of government 
intervention today are weak. The only exception 
where such an intervention seems justified 
is the protection against natural disasters. In 
the other fields, the role of the State in risk 
management must be limited to see that the 
insurance market is running satisfactorily. 
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warns farmers of the risks associated with 
the use of sophisticated financial tools. 
The main role of the EU must consist of 
watching national crop insurance systems in 
order to secure that basic farmers’ conditions 




Agricultural sector development in 19th century 
Scandinavia is typical of industrialized countries. 
On the eve of the second world war, more than 
half of the Swedish population lived in the 
country and depended mainly on agricultural 
sector and forestry income. Nowadays, only 
a few percent of the workforce works in these 
sectors, and the agricultural sector’s share in the 
GNP is no more than 0.5 percent in Sweden. The 
enlarged EU represents a more heterogeneous 
development as indicated in Table 1. 
In short, classic economic sectors cannot play their 
historical part any more. Technical development, 
plants and domestic animals’ improvement and 
other factors have created a situation where a 
minimum percentage of the population can feed a 
whole population. To ensure both level and stability 
of farmers’ income, the households that work in 
these sectors must have links with other parts of 
the economy. This was also understood by people 
that remained in the country during the drift 
from the land period. Among those people, many 
strategies of risk management have developed in a 
more or less spontaneous way, like diversification. 
Cooperative enterprises
In most industrialized countries, the primary 
agricultural sector is mainly composed of small 
and medium enterprises. Buyers of primary 
products, wholesalers and agribusiness are fewer, 
which may create an asymmetric situation close to 
a monopsony. For this reason, farmers have tried 
to get organised in order to increase the power of 
Table 1. Employment share of agricultural, 
forestry and fisheries’ workforce in EU in 
2005 (% of workforce). 
Country Employment
Germany   2%
Austria   6%
Belgium   2%
Cyprus   5%
Denmark   3%
Spain   5%
Estonia   5%
Finland   5%
France   4%
United Kingdom   1%
Greece   12%
Hungary   5%
Ireland   6%
Italy   4%
Latvia   12%
Lithuania   14%
Luxemburg   2%
Malta   2%
Netherland   3%
Poland   17%
Portugal    12%
Czech Republic   4%
Slovakia   5%
Slovenia   9%
Sweden   2%
EU-15   4%
EU-25   5%
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functioning sector, enterprises open and close 
constantly; zero is not the ideal. Moreover, large 
enterprises survive better in difficult times. To 
make a worthy comparison, distribution and 
size of the operators must be comparable. Table 
2 shows the relative number of bankruptcies 
in some sectors of the Swedish economy 
controlled by small and medium enterprises. 
The table shows that the bankruptcies frequency 
is significantly lower—nearly ten times—in 
agriculture and forestry than in other sectors 
Though the sectors’ general conditions are different, 
this result suggests that, in general, farmers 
know how to better manage the sector’s risks.
Diversification
As mentioned earlier, additional incomes, 
sometimes from non-agricultural related sectors, 
play a significant part to ensure a stable and 
negotiation. Though they are small enterprises, 
the situation is similar to the working class’ in 
Scandinavia, where the workers’ movement was 
politically close to farmers’ collective organisations. 
These organisations have developed their own 
processing industries, offering consulting, 
etc., creating thus a common base to manage 
collective risks. As this industry developed, it 
got closer to commercial services, the difference 
lying in the clients also being owners. Risk 
management services are therefore identical to 
those provided by regular insurances. Nevertheless, 
the presence in markets of enterprises owned 
by farmers’ associations constitutes a significant 
factor in the functioning of these markets. 
Indicator of success
The relative number of bankruptcies shows the 
producers’ capacity to manage risks linked to 
a specific sector of the economy. Even in a well 
Table 2. Number of relative bankruptcies in some sectors of the Swedish economy (2007). 
Sector Number of enterprises Number of bankruptcies Bankruptcies, percent
Forestry 114,005 36 0.032
Agriculture 94,328 34 0.039
Fishery 1,723 5 0.29
Computers 31,855 144 0.45
Research and development  3,319 21 0.63
Transportation,  
travel agencies 33,323 210 0.63
Renting  5,856 44 0.75
Wholesale market  
(excl. vehicles) 48,435 481 0.99
Retail business  
(excl. vehicles)  66,236 669 1.01
Automobile industry  
(Trade and services)  20,048 235 1.17
Hotels and restaurants 27,607 371 1.34
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adequate income to households. This strategy is 
shown in Table 3, summarising the part of these 
additional incomes in Swedish farmers’ households.
The figures show that the level of income is more 
or less independent from the farm size. Obviously, 
farmers manage to compensate their income when 
insufficient because of the limited size of the farm. 
These additional incomes come from various 
sources. The integration of rural society in the 
urban economy is made possible through developed 
transportation means. Though Sweden has a low 
density of population,6 more than 90 percent of 
arable land is located within 40 kilometres of a city 
of more than 10,000 inhabitants, a distance easily 
covered by a 30 minute car ride. The significant 
transformation of the economic and social 
structure shown in the table is known as urbanised 
country. More than stabilising the income, this 
household strategy also allows for more intense 
cultural exchanges with non-agricultural society, 
and, in a general way, a higher standard of living.
6 About 20 inhabitants per square kilometer.
Crop Insurance
Crop insurance existed in Sweden from 1961 
to 1994. Initially, this insurance was managed 
by the government. In 1988, the fund was 
privatised and the liability was taken over by the 
Farmers’ Federation. The fund was dismantled 
when Sweden became a member of the EU. The 
government still manages disaster liability, though. 
Financial tools7 
Cooperative enterprises play a dominant part 
in agricultural markets in Sweden. Buyers—
Svenska Lantmännen, Svenska Foder, Kristianstad 
Lagerhusförening, private companies—offer 
forward contracts to eliminate most of 
the uncertainty at farm level. This type of 
insurance covers the basic products—cereals, 
oleaginous plants, some animal products—as 
well as fodder for the breeders’ sector. Svenska 
Lantmännen also offers the possibility to store 
7 Clarin et Karlsson (2008).
Table 3. Swedish farmers’ net average income (SEK) by surface area (number of hectares) 
(2004). 
Surface Income from professional activities Capital income Total
2.1–5.0 347,600 6,300 353,900
5.1–10.0 334,300 8,200 342,500
10.1–20.0 314,500 16,200 330,700
20.1–30.0 302,800 25,000 327,800
30.1–50.0 296,300 33,700 330,000
50.1–100.0 313,100 41,000 354,100
100.1–200.0 335,700 49,400 385,100
> 200.1 358,600 65,500 424,100
Moyen 320,700 23,100 343,800
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the crop before making a financial deal, to allow 
maximum liberty of action to producers.
Buyers also use the whole range of financial 
tools—futures contracts, options—for contracts 
on international markets. This way, it becomes 
possible to make good use of all the advantages 
of sophisticated tools without the farmer’s daily 
management—reasonable work sharing.
Since 2007, one of the commercial banks—
Handelsbanken—offers a platform for futures 
contracts trade on international markets. Registered 
customers can buy or sell contracts through the 
internet on international stock exchanges. To 
date, it concerns about 400 different contracts, 
12 percent of which are in the agricultural sector. 
The use of this opportunity is still limited to 
the biggest enterprises,8 but the interest grows 
as international prices affect farms planning. 
For the insurance against price variations to 
work properly, market price movements must 
be coordinated with producers’ local variations. 
The existence of European stock exchanges 
with developed futures contracts markets is 
therefore essential as harvests in America 
are not always in accordance with Europe’s. 
NYSE Euronext, is the prevailing European 
stock exchange. It was established in 2007 by a 
merging of NYSE Group and Euronext, and has 
headquarters in Paris, Amsterdam and London. 
There is also an independent stock exchange in 
Hannover, RMX, which offers futures contracts 
for livestock (piglets and pigs), and stock 
exchanges in Budapest, Sofia and Warsaw.
Conclusions
The risks overview in the agricultural sector 
is broad and requires various measures: 
regular insurances against fire, etc. insurances 
8 To date, ten.
against diseases, crop insurances for natural 
disasters, additional sources of income against 
a diversification of risks etc. Among these 
solutions, professional diversification is the 
most important one for most enterprises, 
providing other advantages to farmers. 
Concerning general risks—fire, disease, etc.—there 
are long existing solutions and the situation in 
agriculture is no different from other sectors of 
the economy. Among the financial tools, forward 
contracts prevail in individual farms. The use of 
international markets’ sophisticated tools is limited 
to large enterprises and merchants—often collective 
enterprises belonging to farmers in Sweden.
Arguments in favour of government intervention 
in agricultural insurances are weak. The 
government’s part must be limited to disasters, 
watching the market’s competition level, and 
informing, appropriately and sufficiently, 
producer farmers on existing insurance tools. 
At the European Union level, it consists mostly 
of watching domestic systems maintain fair 
producing conditions among member states. 
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Agriculture, Agribusiness  
and Competition Policy
David Spector1
Two policies traditionally opposed
The common agricultural policy (CAP) and 
competition policy are indisputably the two most 
important European policies. One could add 
monetary policy although its sphere of application 
is limited to the Euro-zone. CAP is important 
because of its budget which is more than 40 % 
of the EU budget, i.e. about € 50 billions per 
annum. Competition policy is an important 
EU policy because it allows the EU to assert its 
power  globally. 
However, these two policies are based on seemingly 
contradictory principles. Competition policy is 
based on the idea that a free market is economically 
efficient. In contrast, the CAP is defended on 
the grounds of alleged market failures and the 
importance of not leaving such an important sector 
as agriculture to the vagaries of the market. 
This contradiction was particularly striking before 
the 2003 CAP reform (“Fischler reform”). Several 
of the traditional CAP tools aimed at preventing 
prices from playing their “signaling” role of 
orienting economic agents’ actions—to further 
changes in the economic environment. 
Competition policy is justified on the grounds that 
a market in which prices are determined by free 
competition leads to both productive and allocative 
efficiencies. Productive efficiency occurs when the 
production of one good is achieved at the lowest 
cost possible. When goods are of various qualities, 
productive efficiency is equivalent to the optimum 
ratio between production costs and quality – this 
latter being measured by the price consumers are 
ready to pay. In a competitive market, competition 
1 Associate Professor at Paris School of Economics. Paper trans-
lated into English from the original French by Barbara Bender.
aims to ensure prices close to the production 
costs of the most efficient producers, subjecting 
the others to losses or enticing them to leave 
the market or become more efficient. Thus, in 
theory, for given production costs, only producers 
offering maximum quality survive under vigorous 
competition. Reality is often more complex : 
consumers differ in their ability to pay for superior 
quality, and efficiency requires the coexistence of 
several types of producers, corresponding to several 
combinations of prices and quality. 
Allocative efficiency means that goods are 
produced in quantities leading to maximization 
of the economic surplus, taking into account 
consumers’ preferences and marginal costs of 
production. In a market economy, allocative 
efficiency requires prices paid by consumers to be 
proportional to the marginal costs of production 
of given goods. Usually, a competitive economy 
reaches this goal when each product’s price is equal 
to its marginal cost of production. 
Now, several aspects of the common agricultural 
policy aim explicitly at hindering the operation 
of pricing mechanisms which, in a competitive 
market, would lead closer to productive and 
allocative efficiency. 
The best example of this is the milk quota. 
Established in 1984 and designed to last until 2015, 
the milk quota allocates to each country a quota 
of production which is then shared among the 
country’s farms. In France, the allocation helps to 
maintain milk production in mountainous areas 
where costs are higher. So, by definition, milk 
quotas aim at forbidding production concentration 
in countries and on farms where the costs would 
be the cheapest, that is, preventing a fundamental 
market phenomenon from operating as it does in 
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Production subsidies (abolished for cereals since 
the Fischler reform, but largely maintained for 
breeding, especially in some countries like Spain 
and France), tend to alter some products’ relative 
prices and thereby prevent the competitive pricing 
mechanism from achieving allocative efficiency. 
Indeed, subsidizing meat production without 
subsidizing the production of cereals effectively 
encourages the use of cereals for animal feed rather 
than human consumption. This distortion results 
in higher meat consumption than would otherwise 
be the case. If prices were established by the free 
market, with no public intervention, the recent rise 
of the price of cereals on the global market would 
have led farmers to increase the production of 
food cereals and decrease meat production. This 
would have reduced the profits of breeders’ and 
raised those of cereal producers, thereby putting 
downward pressure on global cereal prices. 
In terms of consumption, the decrease in meat 
production would have lead to an increase in 
the price of meat and a consequent decline in 
consumption. But such a series of events, matching 
the allocative efficiency, is hindered by CAP 
subsidies. Indeed, CAP encourages producers and 
consumers to adapt their decisions to the relative 
scarcity of products rather than to their price. 
The market distortions induced by CAP prior to 
the 2003 reform cost around 0.9% of GDP, a high 
figure given the rather modest share of agriculture 
in the economy (around 2% of the GDP).2
Possible convergences between agricultural 
policy and competition policy
For the last few years, differences between 
agricultural and competition policies have tended 
to lessen.
3 B. Borrell and L. Hubbard, « Global economic effects of the 
EU Common Agricultural Policy », Economic Affairs, vol. 20(2), 
2000.
The changes in agricultural policy following the 
Fischler reform, enforced as of 2005, represent 
a significant step towards the abolition of price 
signal distortions. This reform, together with 
previous ones, replaces production subsidies with 
a “decoupled single payment” under which the 
payment is linked to the prior year’s subsidy, not 
to production. In terms of distributive justice, this 
mechanism may be questionable. It allows, for 
example, cereal producers to benefit concurrently 
from significant government aid and very high 
prices on global markets in 2008.
The other limitation of the Fischler reform is its 
partial nature. Members of the European Union 
were allowed to maintain some coupling – up 
to 25% of arable crops aids, 100% for suckler 
cows and 50% for ovine and caprine premiums. 
Significantly, France chose to limit as much as 
possible the impact of this reform : it chose to delay 
implementation until 2006 (countries could choose 
between 2005 or 2006), and to use the maximum 
allowed “coupling” possibilities. Nevertheless, 
the Fischler reform shows a reorientation of the 
agricultural policy towards market logics. 
As for competition policy, evolution is no 
less significant. Let’s start by remembering 
that, contrary to what is commonly thought, 
the agricultural sector is in fact subject to the 
competition policy.3 Indeed, regulation 26/62 
(adopted in 1962 and replaced by regulation 
1184/2006 which does not amend it significantly) 
states that « Article 81(1) of the Treaty [on 
agreements] shall not apply to such of the 
agreements, decisions and practice referred to in 
Article 1 of this Regulation as form an integral 
part of a national market organisation or are 
necessary for attainment of the objectives [of the 
4 For further details on competition law in the agricultural sec-
tor, please refer to Michel Debroux’ article : « Les raisons d’une 
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Common Agricultural Policy] […] which concern 
the production or sale of agricultural products or 
the use of joint facilities for the storage, treatment or 
processing of agricultural products, and under which 
there is no obligation to charge identical prices, unless 
the Commission finds that competition is thereby 
excluded […] »
As a consequence, even if the agricultural sector 
benefits from specific provisions, these latter must 
nevertheless be subjected to competition policy. 
Moreover, competition authorities frequently 
use their authority to limit sectoral dispositions 
which hamper competition. Thus, in the decision 
related to the “French beef” case, the Commission 
prohibited the French government from setting a 
minimum purchase price for breeders’ customers. 
Although the competition authority continues to 
watch out for restrictions on competition which 
harm consumers, competition policy is evolving 
in a way which should allow it to take into account 
the specific needs of the agricultural sector. The 
competition authority increasingly undertakes a 
case-by-case economic analysis and allows some 
restraints on competition if they compensate 
for obvious market failures in a manner which 
advances consumer interest. 
Before describing specific cases, let us come back 
to the general idea of competition policy. It has 
two significant differences from general economic 
policy. First, its main goal is to promote consumer 
surplus—a different notion from global surplus 
which takes into account both consumers and 
producers. “Ensuring a fair living standard for 
farmers”, which is one of CAP’s objectives, consists 
of paying special attention to producers, and 
thus differs from the objective of competition 
policy—except if we consider that non-distorted 
competitive prices are, by definition, “fair.” 
The other main characteristic of competition policy 
lies in the high evidentiary standards. Based on the 
fact that competition policy relates to the rule of 
law, differentiating it from general economic policy 
may be based on rather uncertain appraisals. 
Consequently, the traditional arguments 
used in favour of the annual 50 milliard Euro 
support for the agricultural sector, whatever the 
circumstances, can hardly be taken seriously by 
competition authorities when ruling on disputes 
related to competition.
For example, security of supply and hygiene are 
irrelevant to the protection of consumers from 
unfair competition. Moreover, some aspects of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (like milk quotas) 
lead towards production restrictions and therefore 
contradict this objective. 
Similarly, irrelevant in cases involving competition 
policy are arguments based on the positive 
externalities created by agricultural activities 
such as the existence and prosperity of the wider 
Agribusiness sector, or the protection of the 
countryside, ecology, and economic life in rural 
areas. Moreover, these arguments are not supported 
by a rigorous analysis and are unlikely to sway 
competition authorities. Finally, the Common 
Agricultural Policy is sometimes justified by strictly 
distributive objectives. Nevertheless, it is hard to 
understand why it would be legitimate to help 
individuals according to their profession, rather 
than their income, especially given that farmers 
do not constitute an underprivileged job category. 
Moreover, CAP subsidies’ major effect is to 
augment land prices not to increase farm income.
On the other hand, in cases dealing with 
professional organisations, competition authorities 
have acknowledged the legitimacy of limited 
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market failures provided the restrictions do not 
harm consumers.
Opinion 08-A-07 of May 7, 2008, on the 
Organisation of fruit and vegetable processing 
industry, released by the Competition Council, 
constitutes one of the clearest examples of this 
flexibility. The Council stated that it has nothing 
against competitors sharing detailed information 
nor their jointly negotiating with distributors. 
A detailed economic analysis showed that 
these practices, usually forbidden, could foster 
productivity and would not harm consumers. 
Sharing information allows producers to better 
anticipate future prices and therefore reduce 
uncertainty when planting their crops. Both the 
economic theory and the empirical analysis show 
that reducing the uncertainty tends to foster 
investment, which favours competition. In as much 
as producers use information-sharing to improve 
transparency and not to increase prices the Council 
ruled that the positive effects out weighted the 
negative ones. 
The question of joint negotiations with distributors 
is more complex. Indeed, from a competition 
policy point of view, redistributing a share of the 
value created by distributors to producers is not 
a valid objective. On the other hand, distributors’ 
purchasing power is often considered a benefit to 
consumers. However, in some cases, distributors 
may use their power to lower wholesale prices to a 
point that producers lose their will to produce and 
improve their products’ quality—knowing that their 
efforts will mainly benefit distributors.
Joint negotiations do not necessarily benefit 
consumers because they can lead to scarcity 
and higher retail prices. The Council therefore 
considered that the imbalance between producers 
and distributors was such that it needed a joint 
negotiation, for consumers’ sake. 
Despite the imbalance between producers and 
distributors, the Council opposed the joint-setting 
of minimum prices, in accordance with all its 
judicial precedents, and the creation of dominant 
supply side positions. 
Nowadays, competition authorities tend to favour 
balance. Suppressing definitively the tension between 
the founding principles of competition policy and 
those of the Common Agricultural Policy is illusive. 
However, convergence is certainly possible. 
To conclude, we must stress that competition 
policy sometimes directly benefits agricultural 
interests, as when it both controls concentration 
in the distribution sector, and, curbs abusive 
practices or cartels of firms providing inputs to the 
agricultural sector. OFFICES
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